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ABSTRACT
PERUVIAN JAPANESE: FROM UNDESIRABLES TO
RIGHTLESS SUBJECTS

by
Nicolas Soto
The University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, 2019
Under the Supervision of Professor Rachel Buff
The incarceration of the Japanese from Peru during World War II occurred due to
the decades long establishment of a Pan-American regime of anti-Japanese
rightlessness. The advent of war facilitated their displacement from Peru, but the
Japanese existed as undesirables in the country since their first arrival to Latin America.
At the executive level, the U.S and Peru coordinated Japanese removal from Peruvian
territory, detaining them in special facilities operated by the Immigration and
Naturalization Service in the United States. While their deportation and incarceration
took place during wartime, the plan to cleanse Peru of the Japanese population was a
response to decades of racial anxiety over the Asiatic race. Considered illegal aliens at
the end of the war, the Peruvian Japanese endured a lengthy legal battle to assert their
right to citizenship. To this day adequate redress continues to escape the Peruvian
Japanese. This thesis adds to the growing scholarship on the violation of the Japanese
Peruvian rights that occurred, and the rightlessness they endured.
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Preface
Following the attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941, the United States entered a
wartime period where the powers of the State expanded to ensure national security, as
the country formally entered the Second World War. These expanded powers, codified
in legal protection by the Alien Enemy Act of 1798 and Executive Order 9066, fostered a
program of institutionalized racism against the ethnic Japanese living in the U.S. As
U.S officials worked to hastily force 120,000 Japanese out of their homes to war
relocation camps, State officials involved with foreign affairs also acted to suppress any
Japanese threats in the ‘other’ America, the Japanese residing in Latin American
countries. Few U.S historians acknowledge this forgotten sub-category of Japanese
incarceration: the deportation and incarceration of Latin-Japanese to the United States
from 1942-1945. Around 80% of the Latin-Japanese incarcerated in these years were
from Peru. The internees held varying citizenship status in Peru. Some had birthright or
naturalized citizenship, while others maintained their residence on legal passports/visas
and work contracts. Deported from Peru, stripped of their rights and documentation,
and incarcerated in the United States, these ethnic Japanese from Peru were victimized
by an unlawful entry process that relegated them to ‘illegal’ status. At the end of the war
they were stateless and displaced, but in reality their statelessness and path to
rightlessness began with their first arrival in Peru in 1899, continuing through the
interwar period until World War II permitted their removal from society.
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Introduction
The story of the incarcerated Japanese-Peruvians poses important questions
about how undesirable subjects are displaced across national boundaries during
wartime. This chapter is related to the incarceration of Japanese Americans, but it is a
distinct and different aspect of this broader history. In it, the United States and Peru
coordinated the deportation of these Japanese people from a country not at war, to a
country at war. This movement of ‘undesirables’ from Peru to the United States violated
principles of international law.1
The term “rightlessness” appears throughout this thesis as a foundation for
understanding the Japanese Peruvian incarceration in U.S concentration camps during
World War II. Examining global history since the end of the war reveals an expanded
consciousness of individual rights, a political, legal, and social discourse intertwined
with the growth of the dominant democratic superpower, the United States. The story of
the Peruvian Japanese is one of displaced subjects long before Hannah Arendt or other
scholars evaluated rightlessness through the lens of the nation-state and post-war
United Nations human rights system.2
Rightless subjects are confined to a particular space within the world system, a
space existing outside the confines of law and order, both inherently possessing no
rights, and facing physical containment in a rightless space, often under the coding of a
“camp.” A person cannot be born into rightlessness, but become rightless through
1

Natsu Taylor Saito, “Justice Held Hostage: U.S Disregard for International Law in the
World War II Internment of Japanese Peruvians-A Case Study,” Boston College
Law Review 40, (1998).

2

Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism (San Diego: Harcourt, 1968), 297.
1

social and political processes. A different conception of identity precedes rightlessness,
a characterization as an undesirable subject within an imagined community and national
body, personae non-gratae. Naomi Paik, explains that an important aspect of
rightlessness is unworthy existence: a rightless subject becomes silenced, removed
from space where they can contest their disappearance into a camp.3 As they become
undesirable subjects, their voice disappears and their silence emphasized. This
renders them, without testimony, unbelievable, beyond comprehension or
understanding for those with rights.
No one moves swiftly from stable status to rightlessness without first undergoing
the transformation into an undesirable subject. The Japanese migrated to Peru, where
they underwent this process. Both the U.S and Peru denigrated their status until the
advent of war led to a Pan-American regime of anti-Japanese rightlessness: displacing
the Japanese from Peru into U.S camps.
Designated as undesirables in their decades long process to becoming rightless
subjects, the Japanese from Peru and their story fits the definition of a rightless human
history. The existence of rightless subjects does not necessarily result from the failure
of our international or nation-state system, which provide rights under a legal apparatus.
As Paik stated, deprivation of rights follows the necessary condition for rights to have
meaning, and to be protected against threats that endanger this balanced system.4
Rightlessness cannot exist without establishing that rights carry meaning, and those
rights cannot be protected without the forming of rightless subjects. Therefore, the era

3

Naomi Paik, Rightlessness: Testimony and Redress in U.S Prison Camps since World
War II (North Carolina: University of North Carolina Press, 2016), 2.
4 Ibid.
2

of higher consciousness of rights actually entailed a rise in rightlessness for particular
populations across the globe. As Paik asserts, the ascension of rights undermined the
legitimacy of rightlessness through camp imprisonment.5 The long history of the motion
of Peruvian Japanese from undesirables to rightless subjects offers anexample of the
adaptability of the U.S rightless regime. The Japanese were displaced from Peru
because of U.S policy and international action, despite the fact that their citizenship and
status had been tied to Peru’s system of rights.
The incarceration of the Japanese from Peru was different than the other
Japanese incarcerations during the war because it operated under the same War
Relocation Authority ideology. But jurisdiction over Peruvian Japanese resided with the
Immigration and Naturalization Service and the State Department. The WRA operated
as a federal agency under the executive branch, enacted through executive power and
led by Roosevelt’s trusted cabinet members. In contrast, Peruvian Japanese faced
deportation and incarceration through the mechanisms of the State Department and U.S
Embassy in Peru. The newly formed INS under the Department of Justice supervised
their incarceration in the camps.
Peruvian Japanese history also illustrates that transnational anti-Japanese
ideology in the western hemisphere was not solely an agenda desired by the United
States. While the United States possessed the economic capacity, physical space, and
legality operating under alien enemy laws in wartime to implement such a program, the
Peruvian state and people were active agents in the process. The plan to deport and
incarcerate the Japanese from Peru did not operate in a vacuum. It was a half-century

5

Ibid., 7.
3

progression of designating the Japanese as undesirable. It was a serious threat to
contemporary Peruvian racial ideology, which was dominated by upper-class
intellectuals, and widely supported by working-class Peruvians. Repressive actions
taken by Peru against the Japanese helped facilitate their removal in wartime with little
opposition. However, while Peru did follow direction from the United States, they also
desired Japanese removal as a form of ethnic cleansing for the nation.
While incarceration of the Peruvian Japanese was represented at the time as a
wartime necessity, their path to incarceration began much earlier than the 1941-1945
period. This parallels the argument against wartime hysteria as the direct cause of
Japanese-American incarceration. Roger Daniels stated, “…This was neither a mistake
nor an error in judgment nor an inadvertence. The wartime abuse of Japanese
Americans…was merely a link in a chain of racism that stretched back to the earliest
contacts between Asians and whites…”6 Daniels asked: “How did it come about that
what had been a popular wartime action, which in the immediate post-war decades was
written off as a wartime ‘mistake,’ is now viewed as a serious betrayal of democratic
ideals…?”7 Responding to this pivotal question, Jasmine Alinder wrote, “Through the
guise of providing protection, the exclusion movement sought to contain the racialized
danger that the immigrant was presumed to present.”8 These scholars explained the
cause of incarceration as a racialized process rather than a preventative wartime

6

Roger Daniels, Prisoners Without Trial: Japanese Americans in World War II (New
York: Hill and Wang, 1993), 1.
7 Roger Daniels, “Incarceration of the Japanese Americans: A Sixty-Year Perspective,”
The History Teacher 35, no. 3 (2002): 299.
8 Jasmine Alinder, Moving Images: Photography and the Japanese American
Incarceration (Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2009), 3.
4

measure. Erika Lee wrote, “Americans learned to define American-ness, by excluding,
controlling and containing foreign-ness.”9
In Peru, racial destiny was a growing obsession during the interwar period. For
many commentators, the Japanese embodied the degeneration of an imagined national
identity premised on intermarriage between indigenous Peruvians and European-ethnic
Peruvians. I argue that Peru, even more than the United States, desired the expulsion
of the Japanese from their society on the grounds of preserving Peruvian racial
harmony. When the advent of war inclined the U.S to begin coordinating deportations
across the hemisphere, Peru was eager to invest in such a program. The Peruvian
State desired the removal of the Japanese because of their threat to a presumed
Peruvian racial destiny, and not because of alleged Axis security threat or fifth column
sabotage. Blacklists of Japanese in the country were compiled by the Peru and the
United States containing names of alleged Peruvian Japanese threats on the most
vague fifth-columnist accusations. While the United States was at least partially
concerned with suppressing Axis threat, Peru used the advent of war to advance its
“Japanese-free Peru” dream. Their preoccupation with the Japanese threat permeated
Peruvian consciousness differently than it did in America. More than any other country,
Peru withheld an obsession over racial anxiety and the identity of the nation.10 As
Nancy Leys Stepan wrote, “They wished they were white and feared they were not.”11

9

Erika Lee, “The Chinese Exclusion Example: Race, Immigration, and American
Gatekeeping, 1882-1924,” Journal of American Ethnic History (2002): 41.
10 Marisol de la Cadena, Indigenous Mestizos: The Politics of Race and Culture in
Cuzco, Peru, 1919-1991 (Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 2000), 45.
11 Nancy Leys Stepan, The Hour of Eugenics: Race, Gender, and Nation in Latin
America (New York: Cornell University Press, 1991), 45.
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Central to this Japanese Peruvian history was the concept of hemispheric
security, which underlined any justifications necessary for unlawful deportations and
incarcerations. Pan-American ideology, coded under the positivity of the ‘Good
Neighbor Policy’, in reality institutionalized the integration of Peru into U.S antiJapanese discourse and security. The expression of American anti-Japanese ideology
transnationally permeated Peruvian administration and inspired parallel legal action. As
the unofficial leader of Pan America, the United States professed racist belief that the
Japanese posed a threat to racial harmony under eugenic ideology. This was admired
and supported in Peru. However, such an assertion does not absolve the Peruvian role,
as being inspired did not connote blindly following American action. Even before
Peruvian and American relations peaked in the 1920’s and 1930’s, Peru obsessed over
stabilizing their own racial hierarchy, promoting nativist principles, and abusing the
Japanese for labor benefits while simultaneously lamenting their threat to “whiteness”
and racial destiny. This thesis aims to demonstrate that while the influence from the
U.S was strong, and Peruvian anti-Japanese policy was enacted years after similar U.S
decrees, Peru was also culpable for the Japanese Peruvian tragedy, and undoubtedly
motivated to remove all Japanese from their society.
The international community, guided by the influence of the United States,
remains incapable of offering absolute rights protections to the individual subject. the
United States continues to both suppress the absolute rights concept and facilitate
targeting undesirable subjects under the threat of security. Even as human rights
awareness heightened across the globe, the US adapted the regime of rightlessness to

6

new trends of international law and rights.12 Nothing demonstrates this more than U.S
courts elongating the trauma of the Japanese from Peru, using their non-status as
illegal aliens in 1945 to continue their displacement, and attempt to exile them when
legally possible. American intrusion into Latin American affairs in the latter half of the
20th century evidenced the adaptability of America’s rightless regime. Installing ruthless
dictatorships like Augusto Pinochet in Chile and Carlos Castillo Armas in Guatemala
demonstrated the capacity of the U.S to force rightlessness on undesirable subjects
outside of war climate, and like the Japanese from Peru, influence subjects beyond the
U.S national boundaries.
As Ayten Gundogdu noted, the management of borders, consequentially, the
protection of those worthy of rights, always relies on creating rightlessness, primarily
displacement and incarceration.13 The U.S regime of rightlessness relies on
incarceration within the context of the nation-state system of security. As they became
rightless, the Peruvian Japanese became unique subjects. Their deportation and
incarceration was facilitated not by the nation-state of Peru, but by cohesive PanAmerican efforts between the United States and Peru. This was not simply a post-war
phenomenon, even though scholarship such as Gundogdu and Arendt responded to the
post-war ascendance of the nation-state security regime. The removal of the Japanese
from Peru complicates the assertion that the nation-state is always the foundation for
rightlessness. Their story of incarceration existed because of a Pan American regime of
rightlessness forged against the Japanese, which inspired parallel national agendas

12

Paik, 7.
Ayten Gundogdu, Rightlessness in an Age of Rights: Hannah Arendt and the
Contemporary Struggles of Migrants (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 2.
13
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from the U.S and Peruvian States. Rightlessness as a concept, an institutional system
of order to protect borders and the security of those with rights, can exist
transnationally, collectively communicated and endorsed between different States.
As Japanese migration to the Americas began in the late 19th century, Peru and
the United States proceeded to exploit the cheap labor of Japanese workers while
simultaneously using them to stabilize their racial hierarchies, which preferred a national
body dominant with European ethnic whiteness. Their arrival to the Americas met
extreme discrimination from the native populations as both countries worked to relegate
the Japanese to the bottom of racial hierarchy. In both countries, the Japanese
struggled to ascend economically, and by the 1920’s and 1930’s posed a significant
threat to racial harmony in the Americas. In response, both Peru and the United States
exercised power, vested in them as sovereign nations, to restrict Japanese rights and
immigration. Although enacted in separate national policies, this response to a threat to
each countries racial destiny was constructed on both national and transnational planes.
The United States, the unofficial leader of Pan-American ideology, set the
standard for anti-Japanese action during the 1910’s and 1920’s. The ideology of PanAmerica took on institutional formation with the creation of various Pan-American
conferences and governing boards. As Pan-America combined with Franklin
Roosevelt’s ‘good neighbor policy’ gained support, and Peru descended into nationalist
politics, the Peruvian State began to model the American anti-Japanese regime. The
laws instituted by Peru and the U.S globalized the anti-Japanese marginalization,’
reducing the Japanese to personae non-gratae, a precursor to their eventual

8

rightlessness.14 Therefore, the story of the Peruvian Japanese decenters the nationstate as the sole executer of rightless histories. Their story is a transnational history
because of the fluidity which racial formation and exclusionary ideology streamed
between the two nations through Pan-Americanism and an alliance of racial and
security ideology against the Japanese. As Erika Lee asserted, these formations and
politics do not necessarily form in the context of the nation-state, but have transnational
origins also.15
Harvey Gardiner and Thomas Connell both wrote monographs on the Japanese
Peruvian incarceration history. Gardiner became the first historian to focus on the
Japanese from Peru within the abundant scholarship on Japanese American
incarceration, establishing the field in the 1980’s. The title of Connell’s work offers
insight into how academics center this incarceration history. Connell’s book, America’s
Japanese Hostages: The World War II Plan for a Japanese Free Latin America, argues
that incarceration of the Peruvian Japanese was a transnational directive, a planned
hemispheric plot to displace the Japanese from the Americas during the war. This
aligned with Gardiner’s argument, that the Japanese from Peru, caught in a triangle of
hate between three nation-states, succumbed to deportation and incarceration during
the execution of a conjoined wartime plan. Both historians dedicate little space to the
pre-war alliance of anti-Japanese ideology between Peru and the United States. Most
of their writing concerns the period of the war, where from 1939-1945 abundant State

14

Erika Lee, “’Yellow Peril’ and Asian Exclusion in the Americas,” Pacific Historical
Review 76, no. 4 (2007), 538.
15 Ibid., 540.
9

Department communication between Peru and the United States clearly evidenced a
united plan against the Japanese when wartime facilitated their expulsion.
I argue that the roots of the Pan-American regime of anti-Japanese rightlessness
and relegating the Japanese to undesirable ‘others’ began as a conjoined effort much
earlier in the 20th century. Reducing the Japanese to undesirable and unbelievable
subjects must be examined by looking at the interwar period, and the origins of antiJapanese racism in the Americas. During the interwar Pan-American meetings the
Japanese were characterized as potential fifth columnists, and warnings were issued to
the American Republics to heighten surveillance on their actions. At a Pan-American
Children’s Conference in 1935 centered in eugenic ideology, the Pan-Americanists
called for defending racial integrity through restricting immigration, which Peru enacted
the following year with their landmark immigration act.16 A Pan-American committee
created in 1942 disseminated to all the American Republics that they should counteract
the “abuse of naturalization” by annulling nationality of Japanese threats.17 Whether
dictating economic discrimination against the Japanese, or proposing eugenic
discourses deeming them a racial ‘other,’ the formation of the plan to eventually deport
and incarcerate the Japanese came to fruition because of the foundation of PanAmerican ideology created in the interwar period. Not just ideology, the administrative
boards at the Pan-American conferences forged practical policy through their

16

Stephanie Carol Moore, The Japanese in Multiracial Peru, 1899-1942 (San Diego:
University of California, San Diego, 2009), 281.
17 As cited in Edward N. Barnhart, “Citizenship and Political Tests in Latin American
Republics in World War II,” The Hispanic American Historical Review 42, no. 3 (1962):
298.
10

recommendations, and influenced the formation of exclusionary measures by the
Peruvian State.
After World War I a climate of nationalism swept across the Latin republics,
creating greater consciousness of border protection, and stabilized the Pan-American
system as a necessary implementation to institute aggressive security policy.
Constantly perceived as an economic doctrine and anti-imperialistic at heart, PanAmerica extended its influence to the sphere of eugenic discourse and racial destiny,
evidencing how racial ‘othering’ by Pan-American leadership was also a core tenet of
ideology, with crucial influence on U.S and Peruvian State action.
Whether through State Department correspondence between the two
administrations, or official Pan-American conferences and recommendations, the
proceedings against the Japanese by the U.S and Peru throughout the pre-war 20th
century were symbiotic. In telling the history of the Japanese from Peru and their path
from undesirable to rightlessness and statelessness, I place a greater emphasis on the
decades before the deportation proceedings began.
I identify the aligning of a model of anti-Japanese discourse and action between
the United States and Peru as part of a “Pan-American Regime of Rightlessness.”
Rightlessness is intertwined with the nation-state and sovereignty, and overshadows the
influence of hemispheric anti-Japanese racial discourse existing in the Americas. But
this transnational discourse inspired national processes. Too often these histories are
told in nation-specific format. Even when histories aspire to be transnational, they often
start and end at migrations across national boundaries, ignoring how ideologies of racial
destiny also exist on a hemispheric scale. The anti-Japanese Pan-American Regime of

11

Rightlessness imposed in Peru interweaves racial exclusion discourse and policy at the
national and regional levels.
I begin this thesis with a chapter on the earliest period of Japanese settlement in
Peru, first examining some of the crucial factors forcing them out of Japan to Peru, and
any rights and status that they carried with them. I analyze this early period in Chapter
one, 1899-1923, focusing on the discrimination they faced as contract-laborers in a
Peruvian climate rampant with anti-Asiatic sentiment. Examining how the Japanese
who migrate to Peru and leave their homeland transform into a form of statelessness,
this chapter explores the ways that their early settlement establishes their place at the
bottom of Peru’s racial hierarchy. From their early settlement the Japanese were
positioned as an ‘other’ by the Peruvian State, as well as the intellectual and workingclasses who were most vocal concerning the racial threat the Japanese posed.
Chapter Two demonstrates how the Pan-American regime of rightlessness
established parallel discourse and policy between the United States and Peru to restrict
Japanese rights and status. As border protection became a dominant discourse,
Japanese immigration was specifically targeted. In Peru, nationalism swept through the
nation during the 1930’s, and the Peruvian State mirrored American exclusion policies.
The intersections of American and Peruvian anti-Japanese actions existed first through
economic discrimination, a reaction to Japanese ascendance to visible economic
success in both countries, before turning to attack their legal citizenship status and
mobility. These racist laws against the Japanese inextricably were a part of PanAmerican ideology of “racial destiny,” with Japanese influence an extreme anxiety for
the perils of “racial suicide” which threated white hegemony nationally and

12

transnationally.18 This is evidenced in the Pan-American security conferences
discussed, as well as the Pan-American eugenic conferences, and consistent
correspondence between the U.S and Peruvian State departments concerning
Japanese influence.
In this period, anti-Japanese sentiment attained a biological and eugenic tone.
Scientific racism infused and justified the move to Japanese incarceration. The few
scholars examining the Japanese deported from Peru focus on their history as a
product of hemispheric security after the Pearl Harbor attack. These arguments are
valid, as the climate of wartime and the attack on Pearl Harbor undoubtedly facilitated a
smooth, undisturbed legal process to deport the Japanese from Peru across national
boundary and incarcerate them.
However, nothing forced anti-Japanese action more than the fear of increased
Japanese presence, primarily, next-generation Japanese on American and Peruvian
soil with birthrights. Offspring from Japanese born on American and Peruvian soil
threatened concepts of racial destiny proliferated and substantiated by the eugenics
movement, most directly because of the citizenship granted to them at birth. Japanese
women in particular warranted intense scrutiny from both States, as reproduction,
sexuality and the rights of Japanese children became political issues.
After examining the regime of rightlessness through the scope of economic and
legal attacks on the Japanese and their citizenship status, I dedicate substantial space
to demonstrate how eugenics and racial destiny intertwined to attack the Japanese

18

Term “Racial Destiny” defined by Moore, 259-294. “Racial Suicide” defined by
Wendy Kline, Building a Better Race: Gender, Sexuality, and Eugenics from the Turn of
the Century to the Baby Boom (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001), 2.
13

presence in the Americas as a racial threat. The fear of the Japanese threat to
Peruvian nationality via the mass reproduction of their race was a significant underlying
rationale for Peru’s desire to deport as many Japanese as possible, demonstrating the
importance of eugenic perspective to this history.
Chapter Three details the administration of Japanese-Peruvian rightlessness,
detailing the deportation and incarceration proceedings. After approximately fifty years
of presence in Peru, the Japanese, already stripped of legal rights and protection under
the Peruvian State, were deported to the United States after the attack on Pearl Harbor.
As they set off from Peru on U.S ships their passports, identity cards, and any other
documentation of their status were discarded and thrown overboard. They officially
became rightless subjects, but in reality their life without proper human rights was a
design over fifty years in the making, and they lived stateless and as personae nongratae for decades. Communication between foreign officials in the United States and
Peru concerning the Japanese reached a peak as they facilitated the deportation
process.
State department records demonstrate how the two countries coordinated this
plan, and also show what legal precedents were used to inform the decision to
incarcerate non-U.S subjects from outside U.S territory. Transnational use of the Alien
Enemy Act from 1798 was complicated, muddied territory, but successful precedent
existed from an earlier situation with Axis nationals in Panamanian territory during the
First World War. I detail this precedent to show how the State Department and Justice
Department configured the incarceration of the Japanese from Peru legal and
acceptable.

14

The incarceration of the Japanese from Peru in WRA camps fulfilled the Peruvian
dream of eliminating the Japanese racial threat and maintaining control over spreading
Japanese influence and militarism. I trace how the actions and results of the
incarceration validate the assertion that Peru perceived the deportation as more than
just a security necessity, but a desired racial cleansing. Even when the war ended, the
Japanese from Peru found little reprieve, with fewer than 10% ever returning to Peru,
and their journey in rightlessness and statelessness enduring into the next half of the
20th century. Peru accomplished their goal, removing as many Japanese as possible,
and preventing their return even as wartime climate dissipated.
The incarceration of the Japanese from Peru occurred due to the decades long
establishment of a Pan-American regime of anti-Japanese rightlessness. The advent of
war facilitated their displacement from Peru, but they existed as undesirables since their
earliest arrival at the beginning of the 20th century. At the executive level the U.S and
Peru coordinated Japanese removal from Peruvian territory and quietly held them in
special facilities operated by the Immigration and Naturalization Service in the United
States. While their deportation and incarceration took place during wartime, the plan to
cleanse Peru of the Japanese population was a response to decades of racial anxiety
over their growing influence. At the conclusion of the war, the Peruvian Japanese were
considered illegal aliens, enduring a lengthy legal battle to establish citizenship and
rebuild their livelihood. To this day redress continues to escape the Peruvian Japanese,
although historical analysis of World War II human histories now dedicates space to
their story. John K. Emmerson, the American diplomat active in facilitating the
deportation program, declared this episode of the war, “…a violation of human rights
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and was not justified by any plausible threat to the security of the Western
Hemisphere.”19 This thesis adds to the growing scholarship on the violation of the
Japanese Peruvian rights that occurred, and the rightlessness they endured.

19

John K. Emmerson, The Japanese Thread: A Life in the US Foreign Service (New
York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1978), 149.
16

Historiography
For original sources, commentary, and analysis, this thesis principally relies on
documents and correspondence found in the State Department archives of the United
States at the National Archives, and online records from the Japanese Foreign Ministry
of Japan and Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores Records of Peru. Furthermore,
published monographs and dissertations by Peruvian actors in the early 20th century,
primarily intellectuals and eugenic and political leaders, help substantiate my assertions
about anti-Japanese discourse and sentiment during the period. There is minimal use
of primary legislation from the period, such as acts of congress and judicial decrees.
Seiichi Higashide’s memoir provides a more personal primary source from the
Japanese Peruvian perspective.
Historical analysis specific to the Japanese Peruvian incarceration history and
their path from undesirables to rightless subjects remains a developing sub-field of
Japanese American incarceration. In 1975 historian Harvey Gardiner published The
Japanese in Peru, 1873-1973, establishing the field of Japanese settlement and
experience in Peru from their earliest arrival until the late 20th century. His century-long
account blended thematic and chronological organization, and devoted space to themes
such as migration, trade, and culture, while briefly addressing the actual incarceration
period during World War II. Gardiner accentuated this field of study when he published
Pawns in a Triangle of Hate: The Peruvian Japanese and the United States,
reconstructing the diplomatic relations between the United States and Peru, which
facilitated the incarceration of the Japanese subjects from Peru.

17

Thomas Connell published America’s Japanese Hostages: The World War II
Plan for a Japanese Free Latin America in 2002. Connell’s work carried many of the
themes found in Gardiner’s analysis, although Connell offered more focus on American
sentiment and the influence it had on Peruvian discourse. My thesis aims to accentuate
this perception by more firmly linking the transnational capacity of anti-Japanese
discourse across both Americas. Both incarceration histories focus almost exclusively
on the incarceration period during the war, only briefly highlighting the foundation of
anti-Japanese designation as undesirables in Peru during the first half of the 20th
century. Due to this, I chose to focus the bulk of my thesis on the decades prior to the
World War, attempting to show that the World War II “Plan” as Connell termed it did not
occur solely as a response to wartime climate and paranoia, but was a progressive path
throughout the first half of the 20th century.
This thesis also leaned on The Japanese in Latin America, a compilation work
edited by Daniel Masterson and Sayaka Funada-Classen to help put the Japanese
Peruvian situation within the context of other Japanese migrations and settlements
throughout Latin America. Erika Lee’s article titled “The ‘Yellow Peril’ an Asian
Exclusion in the Americas’” also provided evidence to the theory that anti-Asian
sentiment, discourse, and policy transcended individual nation-state processes to
become a hemispheric ideology, demonstrating the story of the Japanese from Peru as
transnational beyond their physical crossing of national boundaries.
Since detailing the history of rightless subjects, I consulted Naomi Paik’s brilliant
work Rightlessness: Testimony and Redress in U.S Prison Camps since World War II.
Paik delivered a crucial assertion for this thesis when she demonstrates how
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rightlessness exists and survives in balance with the protection of those perceived to
merit rights, an especially important argument considering the ‘hemispheric security’ at
stake in this history. Ayten Gundogdu in Rightlessness in an Age of Rights affirmed my
belief that the displacement of people remains an adaptable and necessary measure for
protecting rights. This allows this thesis on Japanese Peruvian rightlessness and its
Pan-American nature to permeate larger discussions of post-war U.S continued effort to
impose rightlessness on countries in Latin America with undesirable subjects and
regimes.
This thesis truly separates itself with its discussion of the incarceration history
within the scope and context of scientific racism, racial destiny, and eugenic discourses.
Few historians lay claim to the idea that eugenics played a part in initiating Japanese
incarceration, but in line with Erika Lee’s assertion, I argue that the dialogue and
rhetoric fluidly proliferated transnationally between the United States and Peru indirectly
facilitated the removal of Japanese from society. Always concerned with national
identity and their racial destiny, the reproduction of Japanese in Peru caused more fear
than any other component of Japanese influence, and was directly tied to growing fear
of Japanese militarism. This caused heightened scrutiny of the Japanese woman and
their reproductive capacity, and the rights possessed by Japanese offspring born in
Peru. In a crucial dissertation, scholar Stephanie Carol Moore explored how eugenic
policy gripped xenophobic discourses in Peru, and helped suppress Japanese rights.
Since focusing on a Pan-American regime of anti-Japanese rightlessness, scholar
Nancy Leys Stepan helped establish how such eugenic ideology also was a
transnational product.
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A serious gap exists in this field of study concerning the personal perspective of
Japanese migrants to Peru. Seiichi Higashide published the only substantial
monograph on his experience from his early upbringing in Japan to his path to rightless
subject during World War II. A strong figure in the Japanese community in Peru with
endless observation, Higashide’s voice remains integral for any historian writing a
history of the Japanese in Peru.
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Chapter I: Establishing Japanese in Peru’s Racial
Hierarchy
Introduction to Chapter 1
Before the Japanese arrived in Peru and acquired status as personae-nongratae, the lower-class, peasant caste of Japan that made up the majority of the future
migrants to Latin America suffered as undesirables in their own homeland. As Japan
began an era of modernization in the late 19th century period, their global influence
expanded, but this also relegated a large portion of their lower-class population to
significant economic and social struggle. The Japanese who embarked to Peru left
Japan desperate for economic prosperity and familial stability after decades of torment
under the Meiji era’s abusive labor practices and substantial external violence with other
Asian regions.20 Important for understanding the complete story of the Japanese from
Peru and their path from undesirable to rightless subjects is to recognize how their prePeru existence in Japan also was characterized by statelessness and discrimination.
The Japanese migrants to Peru saw their voyage as a temporary measure to earn a
wage, and return to Japan with improved prospects. Instead, once they left Japanese
borders the majority failed to ever return, and suffered from a negligent homeland
unmotivated to protect or support their nationals abroad.
When they arrived in Peru the Japanese served the crucial role as cheap labor
contract workers in the Peruvian rural scene. Despite their strong work ethic the
Japanese faced instant discrimination and racialization upon their arrival, posing a
20
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threat to Peru’s stable racial hierarchy, which already assigned the Japanese as an
undesirable group due to Peru’s discriminatory history with Chinese coolie laborers.
Even in this early period United States anti-Japanese sentiment and policy reinforced
Peruvian perception toward the Japanese. From their first arrival in 1899 until the early
1920’s, the Japanese suffered under an abusive Peruvian contract-labor system
directed by emigration company sponsorship, with no protection or aid from their
Japanese homeland. In this period the Peruvian State clearly marked the Japanese
subjects in Peru undesirables through economic sanctions and racialization, responding
to perceived Japanese infiltration of the Peruvian economy and racial hierarchy
dominated by European-ethnic whiteness.

Brief Analysis Japanese-Peruvians Struggle pre-Migration
The beginning of the Meiji era in 1868 brought Japan visibility on the world
scene, but debilitated the already shaky economic stability of rural, working-class
Japan. The Meiji era that restored the system of the emperor progressively modernized
Japan’s foreign interests and implemented Japanese expansionist ideology, both which
coincided with a period of rising global capitalism. Primarily a society defined by
agrarian labor and village life, the Meiji era ushered in changes that redefined the
existing feudal concepts of labor relations. The most important change for the
Japanese peasants, who would later make up the majority of migrants to Peru, was the
institutionalization of commercial farming and the establishment of agricultural wage
labor.21 Freed from the constraints of feudal order, the Japanese peasantry harbored
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newfound individual freedom, but still faced significant economic struggle, making the
Meiji transition problematic for this lower caste of Japanese society.
The ability to own or lease land led to taxation struggles for the rural peasantry.
New land taxes placed great burden upon the peasants, as those who owned land often
held less than 1 acre, and a significant proportion of the peasant farmers were still
tenants, not landowners.22 By the 1880’s nearly 10% of all independent peasant farmers
lost their lands due to the rise in taxation, and by 1895 bankruptcy and loss reached a
peak, with over 400,000 peasants losing their land and economic means to sustain
stable family life.23 The violence and turmoil caused by the Sino-Japanese war served
as the culminating experience that motivated the Japanese to seek options abroad to
secure better fortune and prosperity.
This same 19th century period was less fruitful for Peru, struggling with a
depressed economy, bereft workforce, and internal and external security threats.24
However, toward the end of the century, political stability and an economic surge
changed the dynamics of Peruvian labor. Plantation agriculture grew rapidly on the
coastal stretches of Peru, a result of industrialization, which increased economic
opportunity, but required a significant labor force.
Peru first turned to the Chinese throughout most of the 19th century. This
brought varying success, but by 1874 Peru abolished the Chinese Coolie trade and the

22

Ibid., 8.
Ibid.
24 Harvey C. Gardiner, The Japanese and Peru 1873-1973 (Albuquerque, New Mexico:
University of New Mexico Press, 1975). 2. Also Stanlaw, 36-46.
23

23

Chinese migrated to urban spaces.25 These restrictions imposed echoed the Chinese
Exclusion Act issued in the same period in the United States. Rather than attempt to
lure the significant number of the indigenous population, Peru first attempted to draw
European immigrants, before concentrating on establishing trade for cheap Japanese
labor.26 Prior to their arrival, plantation owners considered the Japanese a superior
working race than both their Chinese predecessors in Peru, and the indigenous
population. The Peruvian actors running plantation businesses assigned moral impurity
to the Chinese and the indigenous, and consequently, perceived their moral impurity as
an indication of their racial impurity.27 Chinese desire for Peruvian women and
perceived affinity for opium were just a few of the signs of moral impurity despised by
the Peruvians. Concerning Chinese impurity, one Peruvian writer accused the Chinese
of creating “Indecent houses of prostitutes, gambling parlors…and so many other
iniquities in regard to private and public morality.”28 The indigenous population was
considered vulnerable to criminality and immorality because of their lack of education.
These characteristics determined the Chinese an unfit race for Peruvian labor. The
Japanese, willing to work for cheaper wages than the Chinese, and promoted by Japan
as possessing a strong work ethic, were poised to fill Peru’s labor need. Japan,
struggling with an overcrowding population causing a dearth of work, and Peru, needing
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to locate a substantial work force outside the nation, began negotiating the first
Japanese laborers to Peru.

The Japanese Passport and Absence of Rights Abroad
The majority of the Japanese migrants to Peru made voyage to Peru with a
Japanese passport, a rather new concept during the late 19th century The passport
merits further historical analysis, as they served as the only documents of identity and
status once they left Japanese boundaries. Furthermore, the Japanese, gradually
deprived of their rights throughout the 20th century in Peru would have their passports
and identification confiscated and discarded when they embarked on deportation ships
during the incarceration era. Before looking at how their rights were deprived in Peru,
what rights, if any, did the passport allocate to the transnational Japanese migrants?
The introduction of the modern passport during the 19th century coincided with
the developing idea of the nation-state. John Torpey, a scholar on the history of
passports, wrote, “The historical development of passport controls…a way of
illuminating the institutionalization of the idea of the ‘nation-state’ as a prospectively
homogeneous ethnocultural unit, a project that necessarily entailed efforts to regulate
people’s movements.”29 He further asserted that only through documentation of
nationality, since nation-states are both territorial and ethnocentric, can boundaries be
formed which separate nationals from non-nationals.30 Passports represent a unique
case of documentation, as they involve cooperation within an international system or
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society, as well as the maintenance of an attachment to the specific norms of different
nation-states.
Now an accepted component of international movement, in the 19th century there
was debate over just how integral a passport should be for restricting or allowing human
transnational movement. In England, passport provisions were unenforced until 1906,
with foreigners having largely unrestricted rights to enter foreign territory and hold
residency.31 Germany passed an 1867 passport law that abolished passport and visa
requirements for both the nationals of the State and foreigners.32 Most scholars ascribe
this trend to the economic liberalism sweeping Europe and the globe. As Eric
Hobsbawm claimed, the free movement in economic production required the free
movement of people for labor production.33 At the same time, widespread
democratization required identification to become more important, as States became
increasingly concerned with making distinction between their own citizens and nonnationals.
Therefore, by the late 19th century, passports in the West were characterized
more as markers of identification, citizenship, and nationality, rather than necessary
documentation for transnational movement. The course of discussion in the United
States during the century designated authorization of passports as a State Department
task meant primarily for only citizens, as the U.S passport trended toward functioning as
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a citizenship certification.34 In Great Britain the passport was a method to counter
detention abroad, a proof of their nationality.35 These Western countries allowed
transnational movement and passports to intersect with rights protection abroad. The
Japanese State enforced less protection through passports for their Japanese citizens
moving abroad. The Japanese to later migrate to Peru found little protection of their
status and rights once they departed from Japanese boundary, constituting an early
form of statelessness. As lower-class peasants already persecuted under Meiji reforms
imposing severe economic hardship upon the future migrants, the Japanese clearly
could not rely on a protective homeland state.

The Japanese Migrant vs. The Western Migrant
The Japanese passport was simple, containing name, addresses, occupation or
trade, age, vague physical description, and purpose of travel.36 They also did not
include expiration dates, but stated the permitted length of stay, which was crucial for
the future Japanese immigrants in Peru working labor contracts.37 Unrestricted border
crossing by the Japanese to neighboring Asian nations was prevalent throughout most
of the pre-Meiji era before the institutionalization of passports.38 By the 1860’s Japan
sought to emulate the Western system of passport and movement they perceived to be
in place. In reality they established passport legislation in the 1870’s while the rest of
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Europe and the United States trended toward liberal movement and transforming the
passport from a method of movement to an identifier of citizenship.39
Most pertinent to the history of the Japanese in Peru was how the traveler and
the Japanese State perceived the passports, and how the Japanese passport differed
from those in the West. Takahiro Yamamoto found in his research that passports in
Western nations were both documents for travel and proof of citizenship, as
demonstrated, instrumental in protecting citizens abroad subject to unjust arrests or
detention.40 In this respect, the passports greatly served the traveler or migrant in
addition to the State, and moving into the 20th century, the passport continued to identify
more with citizenship in the West, especially as xenophobia increased and suppressed
the liberal movement era.
While many of the Japanese did obtain official passports for their travel, they
operated closer to work-labor contracts. The Japanese government did not in fact
require passports in their initial 19th century commemoration of passport laws.
Approximate figures of passports issued and census figures of the Japanese show
about one-third of the Japanese in Peru in the first immigration period (1899-1907)
possessed passports.41 For those who did, the Japanese passport held less
significance than a Western passport, and did not assist travellers to prove identity,
citizenship, or nationality, and provided no legal use or human rights protection.42
Japanese abroad bore the responsibility for their actions and were vulnerable to unjust
39
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action by the Peruvian State, as the Japanese government only concerned themselves
with their nationals abroad when they crossed or re-entered national boundary. In
addition to their movement to Peru, substantial number of Japanese also migrated to
other areas during the late 19th century. Over 200,000 migrated to Hawaii and the U.S,
60,000 to Russia and Canada, and in all cases were vulnerable to discriminatory
practices of the state. Yamamoto explained this while examining the fees paid for
passports. He stated, “Whereas the European passport application fee could be
understood as a price for receiving due privileges en route, the application fee for a
Japanese passport was nothing more than a tax…”43
The only protection or rights granted to the Japanese migrants came under the
Emigrant Protection Act of 1896 in Japan. This act was intended to protect emigrants
from dishonest emigration agents by only permitting emigration through emigrant
companies and through their issuances of passports and work-contract visas. The act
defined the labor contracts of emigrant workers as valid and enforced the obligation for
honoring contract wages, and required the emigrant agencies to pay dues to the
Japanese government.44 However, this law was enacted more to protect the Japanese
from corrupt, private emigration officials and exploitation by emigration companies.
Emigration companies frequently engaged in fraudulent practices to make profits, such
as charging emigrants high commissions and getting rebates from shipping companies
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for each passenger.45 Furthermore, the Japanese government continued to serve as
protection agents for the Japanese from the emigration companies themselves.
However, their interest in protecting immigrants in Peru was a long-term investment for
further economic development and international prestige, not based in humanitarian
grounds.46 The well being of the individual immigrant was only of interest to the State
for the sake of the nation.
Why was this significant for the Japanese who would embark to Peru at the turn
of the century? The Japanese passport clearly did not serve the traveler, and likewise
only served the Japanese State’s interest in regulating illegal border crossing, leaving
the Japanese passport to possess significance only at the discretion of the Peruvian
State. Furthermore, the Emigrant Protection Law only provided vague protections for
the Japanese emigrants, with the emigration companies finding exploitative loopholes.
Therefore, the Peruvian State possessed wide discretion to manipulate Japanese
labor and their status. This context demonstrated how vulnerable the Japanese were to
gross surveillance measures and the restriction Japanese rights to fit ‘hemispheric’
security dogma. Japanese documentation and legal protection, even earlier than the
20th century protectionist era, already relegated the Japanese to a form of ‘stateless.’
Japanese became rightless subjects during the mid-20th century after progressing from
immigrant status to undesirable or personae non-gratae in Peru. As they left Japan and
were isolated people beyond Japanese boundary, indicating outside of Japanese rights,
they arrived in Peru unbounded to any state. As will be corroborated when discussing
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their racialization in Peru’s social hierarchy upon their arrival, the Japanese struggle as
undesirables in Peru began in part due to the circumstances, and rights, they left behind
in Japan.

Personal Perspective-Introducing Seiichi Higashide
Seiichi Higashide, an ethnic Japanese who later migrated to Peru in the 20th
century, published a memoir on his turbulent upbringing in Japan, his path to
undesirable in Peru, and his eventual rightlessness experience during World War II.
Like many Japanese at the time, Higashide’s early years in Japan were fraught with
economic and labor hardship. He detailed how he saw irrigation labor workers forced to
work shirtless in the freezing winter, a method used by project supervisors to increase
work ethic.47 Higashide himself worked numerous hard labor jobs in Japan, from
farming to factory work, and struggled to find means to advance his education.48 When
he finally was able to continue his education, he increasingly hoped to use his
connections in academia to leave Japan for a better opportunity abroad.
Higashide wrote, “The biggest obstacle to my plan was obtaining a passport.”49
Attempting to travel to Peru in the late 1920’s, he was not wrong according to the
legislation active in both countries at the time. Mirroring the 1924 Immigration Act in the
U.S that halted Asian immigration, Peru at the time prohibited free immigration, and the
Japanese government stopped issuing passports to Peru. Higashide, with help from a
university professor, was able to obtain a passport illegally on the grounds of being
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‘called for employment,’ faking his connection to an employer in Lima, one of the few
ways a Japanese national could bypass strict passport prohibition.50
How Higashide obtained his passport is crucial for multiple reasons. It further
evidenced the disjointed nature of the process for issuing Japanese passports to Peru.
Potential Japanese migrants increasingly found their situations determined by the
discretion of the Peruvian State. Peru permitted issuance of Japanese passports only
through family relations or by Japanese companies in Peru requiring migrant Japanese
labor. Higashide arrived in Peru in 1930, a year after Peru reformed the immigration
system by officially placing Japanese migration under State jurisdiction, allowing the
Peruvian Director of Immigration final approval over mandating Japanese entry.51
Previously Peru approved Japanese passports through the Japanese Association in
Tokyo with assistance from the Peruvian foreign ministry. This further demonstrated
disconnect between the Japanese government and officials in Peru, a gap that had
tragic effects for unprotected Japanese citizens in Peru. Lastly, it highlighted the
extreme conditions present in Japan, as Higashide, a law-abiding citizen, would do
anything to escape his hardships for an unknown life abroad.
Some with Japanese passports and others with temporary labor contracts, the
Japanese embarked to Peru starting in 1899, continuing into the 1920’s. Their
settlement and initial experience prior to the Peruvian turn to extreme nationalism in the
1920’s and 1930’s was still marked by discrimination and deprivation. Their passports
provided them means for their travel, and defined their contract work and length, but
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offered little stability in their settling experience. The restriction on their mobility and
status gradually increased during their settlement throughout the 20th century. They left
Japan undesirable components of Japan’s envisioned Meiji nation, with documentation
providing no rights or protections abroad, leaving them vulnerable to the consequences
of Peruvian discrimination and racial hierarchy. Their early settlement period in the first
two decades of the 20th century provided insight into their ongoing path to becoming
‘statusless’ subjects.

Early Settlement Experience in Peru 1899-1920- Placing the Japanese
in Peru’s Racial Hierarchy
The Morioka Emigration Company first promoted the idea of Japanese migration
to Peru in 1898. Two figures, Teikichi Tanaka, and Augusto B. Leguía, Leguía a future
president who became an entrenched figure in Japanese-Peruvian relations,
established tentative terms for a shipment of Japanese workers.52 The initial Japanese
labor shipments from 1899-1908 were authorized through non-government, emigration
agencies, rather than government-contract emigrants. This system of emigration would
increasingly be detrimental to the situation of the Japanese in Peru, although the ‘free’
emigration period that followed in the 1920’s and 1930’s would continue the pattern of
labor discrimination.
When Leguía and Tanaka agreed to terms on the first shipment of Japanese
workers on the ship Sakaru Mara, the Japanese government sold the workers on stable
earning, respectable working conditions, and a beautiful climate devoid of disease.53
Japanese laborers immediately found that the propaganda put forth by the Japanese
52
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State was distorted. Exposed to diseases unheard of in Japan, such as beriberi,
malaria, yellow fever and dysentery, approximately 143 of the 790 original Japanese
laborers succumbed to various diseases and died.54 As more Japanese died, and
others suffered from illness and were unable to work, tension between the emigration
companies and the various plantations magnates increased. From the perspective of
the plantation owners, the contractual arrangement calling for able-bodied men ages
20-45 was not met, since such large proportions of the migrants befell serious illness
and disease. Emigration companies struggled to improve the health conditions for the
Japanese.
Anti-Japanese sentiment among the Peruvians, from both the plantation
employers and the general Peruvian population exposed to the Japanese laborers,
fostered a dangerous environment for the Japanese. The language barrier between the
Japanese and the Peruvians compounded relations and mistrust between the two
demographics. Peruvian workers viewed the Japanese as thieves, invading their
landscape and stealing jobs from native Peruvians still recovering from the economic
struggles of the late 19th century.55 Furthermore, the language issue allowed suspicion
and destructive rumors to circulate concerning the Japanese, which led to early
instances of violence. The primary emigration agent, Teikishi Tanaka, within three
months of the first shipment wrote, “Feelings against immigrants strong…have been
clashes with Peruvians. Situation out of control.”56
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One story in particular emphasized the plight of the Japanese situation in Peru in
the early 20th century. Michitaro Shindo, a representative of the Meiji Emigration
Company, traveled to Peru to negotiate a migrant labor contract with the Inca Rubber
Company. The two parties settled on 5,000 workers to Peru within the next five-year
period. Within the first year, it became clear such a high number of workers were not
required, and a mere 500 men sufficed. Between the Inca Rubber Company and
Shindo representing the Meiji Emigration company communication over how to settle
this problem failed to reach the agents facilitating the shipment of the next laborers to
Peru. 754 workers arrived in Peru and quickly learned there was no work or contract for
their services, and no other region currently provided equal-pay agricultural work.57 The
Meiji Company and Inca Rubber Company pointed the blame at each other, and the
infuriated Japanese workers were forced to settle for overwhelmingly unfavorable
contracts. They complained that this constituted a violation of the Emigrants’ Protection
Law, but their situation remained unchanged.58
Such exploitation of the Japanese laborers for the purpose of economic profit on
behalf of either the Japanese companies or the Peruvian corporations was common. It
further illustrates the lack of voice provided to the Japanese to protest their own
discrimination and situation. Without adequate Spanish language skills, and primarily
an uneducated workforce, the Japanese were easily manipulated by agents from their
own country, and also the landowners and managers of their employment in Peru.
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Racial Anxiety: Legacy of Slavery, Afro-Peruvians and Chinese
Perhaps no other nation in Latin America possessed such powerful racial anxiety
over national identity than Peru. The abundance of intermixed races between
European, Indian, and Black races in Peru led Peruvians to accept social discrimination
as widespread due to cultural differences rather than biological ones. Intellectuals in
Peruvian society widely denied the existence of any pure white race, even if the desire
for “whitening” was a popular concept.59 Marisol de la Cadena stated, “Peruvian
modern discourses that acquit racist practices and even legitimize them by appealing to
culture are integral to the political process through which in Peru…race was culturally
constructed…culture was racially defined.”60 However, a belief that acquired
characteristics were inherited demonstrated how Peru’s conceptualization of race
remained intersected with biological notions. Belief in inherited traits suited the
intellectual class of Peru who relied on education as the premier path to racial
redemption. Describing the intellectuals, Marisol de la Cadena argued, “Because race
manifested social experiences in process, its popularity among turn-of-the-century
Peruvian elites…derived from its ability to express feelings of superiority while
scientifically legitimating these emotions.”61 The tension between cultural and biological
aspects of race dominated discourse over the subject in 20th century Peru. The
Japanese combined racism of both aspects to form a distinct threat to Peru’s racial
destiny, as they were of yellow skin tone biologically inferior, while also culturally unfit
for the nation’s identity.
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Legacies of slavery and the precedent set by the Chinese laborers before them
formed two pillars of Peruvian society that worked against the Japanese attempt to
comfortably settle in Peru. Before the Japanese contract workers the Peruvian
plantation system depended exclusively on labor from African slaves or Chinese coolie
labor.62 Despite the abolition of slavery several decades before, plantation employers
perceived the Japanese as non-human bodies of labor, undeserving of organized wage
structure or contractual agreements promised to them by the emigration company
contracts. They were, in fact, deeply offended that the Japanese even presupposed
such negotiations of terms possible. The Chinese Coolies were vehemently disliked by
the Peruvians for their cheap labor services that supplanted Peruvian jobs, and for the
perception that they transported infectious diseases to Peru.63 Even as early as the
mid-19th century anti-Asian and anti-African sentiment coalitions in government moved
against colored laborers ascendance in the Peruvian workforce. The term “Asiatica”
became a derogatory insult for the Chinese, and this was transplanted onto the new
Japanese arrivals at the turn of the century.64 The industrious nature of the Japanese
migrants, with a strong work ethic and desire to earn equal compensation to the
Peruvians angered the Peruvian natives, and led to physical attacks and attempts to
manipulate Japanese contracts.
Intellectual elite in Peru set the tone for racial discourse throughout the entire
Asian migration period. Discussed later as the primary instigators of anti-Japanese
legislation justified on racial destiny discourse, their attacks on the Chinese became
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transplanted onto the Japanese upon arrival. Manuel Gonzalez Prada termed the
Chinese “degenerate,” “feeble,” and a “vicious germ and decrepit.”65 Clemente Palma
wrote the Chinese were “degenerate and dirty,” and lamented that the Chinese sent to
Peru were the most inferior within Chinese caste system.66 This was echoed later with
the Japanese, as the migrants mostly came from the peasant class of rural Japan. It
was easy for intellectuals to lump the Chinese and Japanese derogatory sentiments
together. Writer Felipe M. Boisset recommended Asians not “bother the countries that
are superior to you ethically and ethnically, and do not degenerate those who teach you
an evolution more in concordance with the destiny of men.67
The perceived inferiority of the Afro-Peruvians further stabilized Peru’s racial
hierarchy and the placement of the Japanese at the bottom. The term mestizaje
generally refers to racial mixture of African, indigenous, and European (Spanish)
descent in Peru and throughout Latin America. Scholar of gendered Afro-Peruvian
racism Sylvanna M. Falcón asserted that in Peru common conceptualization of
mestizaje explicitly condenses this plurality, relegating the African heritage mostly
invisible.68 Little consensus on Peru’s national identity crisis ever existed due to the
conflict between Peruvian desire for “whitening” and the opposition to this posed by a
sizeable indigenous population. Concerning racial hierarchy, the Afro-Peruvian and
Japanese existed on the same level simply because of color. On the racial hierarchy,
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however, Afro-Peruvian sentiment aligned and influenced with anti-Japanese simply
because of color. As all groups of Peruvian society sought to lay claim to their
whiteness, Afro-Peruvians and Japanese were limited because of their skin. Similarly,
the Japanese found it impossible to identify with a claim to whiteness, and therefore,
discrimination and racialization levied at Afro-Peruvians similarly was imposed on the
Japanese.

Restricting Japanese Mobility
The discrimination in the Japanese contracts severely limited the mobility and
agency of the Japanese, as their Japanese passports were tied to the terms of their
contractual agreement and length of stay, offering no security. The key components of
the terms agreed upon in the first contracts were as follows: 4 year contracts, 25 yen
per month, and deducting yen per month to the emigration companies to cover the
expense of their eventual return to Japan (and this money stayed with the companies
when the majority of the immigrants were forced to settle permanently).69
Unsurprisingly, disputes arose as the Peruvian plantation owners failed to adhere to the
strict regulations. Despite no binding regulations, the Japanese were forced to buy
supplies from high-end Peruvian merchants instead of at low-cost Chinese shops,
causing expense that decreased their net income.70 At the largest plantation at Casa
Blanca, Japanese workers were not compensated for the occasions where they doubled
their workload and hours.71 Some reports were issued stating that the Casa Blanca
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managers refused to pay the full original contract rate.72 A bilingual mediator was sent
from Japan to help alleviate the distrust, and while he succeeded in tentatively
stabilizing wages, he did so now at 20 yen per month.
This brief interlude of stability ended with the next shipments of Japanese
workers and the shift by Peruvian sugar planters from wage labor to the tarea, a
piecework system where earnings differentiated by the type of work.73 This infuriated
the Japanese, who often struggled to work more than one ‘piece’ at a time, significantly
lowering their net profit. Whereas the rigidness of a wage system prevented wholescale
manipulation, the tarea system fostered abuse from the landowners who possessed
wider discretion to individualize each Japanese laborer’s earnings in the interest of the
employer.74
Relating to the issue of passports and Japanese mobility, the subsequent
contingents of Japanese contract worker cohorts after 1905 faced a significant change
as the four-year contract period was replaced by a six-month period, a drastic shift for
the Japanese experience in Peru.75 The Japanese who wished to remain in Peru
beyond the six-month period had to fight to preserve their passports. The Japanese
struggled to assimilate into Peruvian culture and earn the respect of the Peruvian
natives, and the six-month contract further hindered assimilation initiatives such as
learning Spanish.76 While the Japanese were ‘free’ after six months, the widespread
dislike they faced combined with their limited skill beyond farming forced some into work
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as household servants.77 Peruvian employers actually disliked the six-month contract
system also, as it forced them to constantly search for new workers, and lessened their
authority over their Japanese laborers.
Despite the forthcoming period of a restrictive State defined by repudiation of the
Japanese in favor of nationalism, the period from 1906-1923 actually facilitated
increased mobility for the Japanese.78 Rather than succumb to the discriminatory
factors confronted in Peru during the first years of emigration, the Japanese
demonstrated great adaptability to their conditions. Their identity as a source of cheap
labor allowed them to find new opportunities beyond the plantations. The blatant
alterations of their contracts and wages, the diseases they faced, and the manipulation
of their remitted savings for returning to Japan frustrated the Japanese, but only spurred
their motivation to succeed. Their work ethic and adaptability, combined with Peruvian
employers favor towards their labor over others for economic reasons pushed the
Japanese to move to urban settings. Their demonstration of mobility and achieving
economic well-being in urban settings show how they overcame Peruvian hostility to
carve their own success. Contract labor through the medium of emigration companies
was abolished in 1923, beginning a new phase of Japanese migration directed by
Japanese-State facilitation and ‘free’ emigration labor.79
As the Japanese demonstrated transnational mobility when they abandoned their
sufferings in Japan, they also navigated their settlement in Peru during the first two
decades since the first emigration in 1899. Finding economic stability required stages
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of mobility: leaving their homeland, finding temporary livelihood in rural Peru, and lastly,
attempting to establish permanence in urban Peru.80 By the 1910’s high proportions of
the Japanese Issei had moved to Lima and other urban sites and started other trades,
such as retail, barber shops, grocery stores, and restaurants.81 The industrious nature
of their economic pursuits brought these successes, but also won them even greater
hostility through their increased exposure in the urban setting. Newspapers began to
publish disgruntled stories about the Japanese threat economically and militarily. The
‘clannish’ nature of the Japanese who assembled together in business ventures was
met with suspicion and resentment.
Content with the Japanese as subordinate to Peruvians through the contract
labor system, Peruvian intellectuals and the working class grew increasingly weary of
their influence and mobility. New Japanese arrivals on the shores of Peru were met
with immediate repudiation in the Peruvian press, which was a major force in
proliferating the anti-Japanese climate in the 1920’s and 1930’s, bridging the sentiment
of the people to the policies of the State. In the newspaper La Tradición, one writer
exclaimed that Japanese and Asiatic immigration was a cancer to the body of Peru.82
The leader in anti-Japanese newspapers, El Tiempo, falsely reported that the Japanese
monopolized 99% of small businesses in Peru, calling for an end to the ‘yellow
plague.’83 Letters written from the Peruvian public and published in newspapers begged
for restricting Japanese immigration and ‘Peruvianizing’ the economy. These economic
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grievances under false premises, combined with the apparent threat of Japanese
militarism, led to a second period of Japanese settlement in Peru characterized by
limiting their mobility and restricting their identity and legal status in Peru. Suddenly, the
mobility of the Japanese came under the surveillance of Peruvian authorities who now
attempted to regulate their means of travel back to Japan for visits or studying,
restricting their passports, and threatening that they would lose their jobs and homes if
their movement was suspicious.

Early Pan-American Regime of Discourse and Policy against
Japanese
Japanese migration patterns to Peru generally developed just a few years or
decades after Japanese migration to the United States. As the Japanese left Japan in
the late 19th century and embarked for settlement in the Americas, it became clear that
precedents set by the United States against the Japanese often shaped Japanese
racialization and their path to personae non-grate in Peru. Even before the 1920-1945
period when the United States and Peru diplomatically aligned to ‘other’ the Japanese,
anti-Japanese developments in the U.S were reflective on Japanese Peruvian
settlement.
Chinese coolie systems dominated agricultural labor in both countries in the
aftermath of slavery, until the Page Act of 1875 and the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882
prohibited further Chinese immigration to the U.S and barred the Chinese from
naturalized citizenship.84 These measures were justified racially by the belief in
Chinese in-assimilability, while also perceiving their bodies as disease-ridden and weak.
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Surveillance and scrutiny of the Chinese was heightened unlike any other demographic
and established precedent for perception of the Japanese. In the same period as the
U.S anti-Asian policies, Peru created special labor recruitment programs specifically
targeting the Irish and Spanish respectively.85 The Criollos, the South American born
descendants of Europeans in Peru, constituted only ten percent of the population, but
always strived to incorporate more European whiteness into the nation. The Peruvian
government twice subsidized European and U.S immigrants exclusively, in 1873 and
1906, intending to curtail Asian immigrant growth.86
No facet of their racialization evidenced this more than the implementation of
stringent identification and documentation requirements. Anna Pegler-Gordon
discussed how Chinese laborers were required to register their presence and document
their registration in the States before any other race.87 By 1909, all people of Chinese
ethnicity were obligated to possess photographic documentation upon entry, and could
be demanded to show photo identification at any time while within U.S boundary.88 Not
only were the documentation measures also imposed on future Japanese arrivals in the
Americas, but also the hyper inspection of the Asiatic body became a staple feature of
immigration measures. As discussed in Chapter 2, associating the Japanese body, and
particularly the Japanese female body, with weakness and hyper-sexualization, arose
as an integral discourse for promoting anti-Japanese sentiment and spreading fear of
Japanese reproduction.
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In 1907 and 1908 U.S president Theodore Roosevelt conducted secret
negotiations with Japan now known as the ‘Gentlemen’s Agreement,’ which had a
profound effect on the Japanese situation in Peru. This unofficial policy was an
agreement with Japan to no longer supply Japanese laborers with legal passports to the
United States.89 The influence of this measure on Peru led to two contradictory results.
Peru, allowing Japanese labor migrants since 1899, specifically exploited and solicited
expanded Japanese immigration, something likely economically motivated as
emigration companies sought expanded profits. At the same time, the surge in
Japanese agricultural workers in Peru led many of the initial Issei immigrants to seek
farming opportunities beyond contract plantation work, increasing their mobility within
Peru. This caused great alarm for the Peruvian State who followed American example
and searched for methods to curtail increased Japanese influence.
In 1910 the Peruvian State enacted a decree stipulating that colonists in the
Sierra mountain regions, the most heavily Japanese populated area of Peru, could only
be of Peruvian or European origin.90 Starved for adequate labor and settlement
possibilities, the Japanese in both the U.S and Peru began using their mobility to
challenge the measures imposed upon them. The Japanese in the United States used
a loophole in the 1907 ‘Gentlemen’s Agreement’ to legally ‘call’ for Japanese women
migrants to the States, helping to balance their population, establish family
communities, multiplying their population despite restricted labor immigration.91 In Peru,
the land laws forced the Japanese to move toward urban areas of Peru, primarily the
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Lima/Callao region, and expand their labor skill into new successes such as retail and
business. Japanese responses to State restrictions in both countries showed the
resilience and adaptability of the Japanese abroad, but also brought even greater
visibility to their settlement. Moving into the 1920’s and 1930’s, both Peru and the
United States reacted by imposing even stricter regulations on Japanese status,
designating them undoubtedly as undesirable subjects, and suppressing their rights
through any means possible.
Nationalism swept across Peru in subsequent decades prior to World War II, and
the Peruvian State began implementing these rigid legal measures upon the Japanese
in response to anti-Japanese sentiment in Peruvian intellectual circles and the working
class. The measures put in place would significantly influence and facilitate the ability
of the United States and Peru to later deport and incarcerate the Japanese from Peru
under the veiled concept of ‘hemispheric security’ when war broke out in the 1940’s.
From 1899 to the 1920’s anti-Japanese action in Peru derived inspiration and influence
from the United States, and this trend accelerated further in the interwar period. The
concept of anti-Japanese discourse and policy became a staple program of PanAmerican security agenda declaring the Japanese personae non-gratae in the
Americas. The rights of the Japanese in Peru were now firmly vulnerable to the
discretion of the Peruvian State working fluidly within American anti-Japanese ideology.
A Pan-American regime of anti-Japanese discourse and rightlessness was founded in
the early 20th century, and transformed into practical measures during the interwar
period.
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Chapter II: Undesirables: Aligning anti-Japanese
Exclusion and Rights Restriction between the U.S and
Peru
The Japanese in Peruvian Politics
In 1919 Augusto Leguía ascended to the Presidency and held the position from
1919-1930, a transformative decade for the Japanese in Peru. Leguía came to power
after a violent coup d’etat, installing a conservative regime marked as a dictatorship by
most Peruvian historians.92 Two legacies of his reign had profound influence on the
Japanese from Peru: his rampant pro-American ideology, and the robust xenophobia
that his actions produced among the Peruvian populace. His eleven-year dictatorship,
known as the Oncenio, at times benefited the Japanese situation, but ultimately created
a foundation for nationalist ideology to plague Peruvian politics in the subsequent
administrations. Although publicly a Japanese sympathizer, Leguía’s presidency played
a crucial role in relegating the Japanese to the firm status of ‘menace,’ both by the State
and the Peruvian people.
Recalling him from chapter one, President Leguía was the primary Peruvian
business figure conducting the first negotiations for Japanese migrant workers to arrive
in Peru. In the late 1890’s as manager of a prominent sugar company, Leguía led
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negotiations with the Morioko Emigration Company to secure Peru’s first Japanese
laborers. Leguía never shed his pro-Japanese inclinations when he assumed the
presidency at the onset of the 1920’s. His detractors consistently used his historical
association with Japanese immigration to their advantage in attempts to usurp his
influence and turn public opinion against him. The Japanese in Peru referred to him
warmly as ‘Regia san,’ and a further 9,000 Japanese newcomers arrived in Peru during
his eleven-year reign.93 Statistics show between 1918 and 1930, the Japanese
population grew from 9,890 to 20,385 persons, by 1925 becoming the largest minority in
Peru.94 Leguía’s legacy firmly stabilized the Pan-American nature of anti-Japanese
exclusion and restriction in Peru. Before looking at administrative policy, it is important
to understand where anti-Japanese sentiment in Peru was strongest.

Racial Nativism in Peru-Where did Japanese attacks come from?
Sometimes referred to as a golden age of Japanese experience in Peru, the
Leguía period coincided with reinforced notions of racial identity and nativism in Peru,
which further proliferated the idea of the Japanese as undesirable subjects. AntiJapanese sentiment extended across the Peruvian landscape, but can be specifically
narrowed to two factions of Peru: the upper-class intellectual right which dominated the
Peruvian State, and urban working-class European-ethnic native Peruvians. These two
factions organized their racialization of the Japanese differently. The intellectuals levied
a scientific political discourse against the Japanese concentrated on eugenic concepts
of morality and nation building, while working-class Peru was predominantly upset with
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the perception that the Japanese drained the Peruvian economy. Nonetheless, I argue
the economic competition between the native working-class and the urban Japanese
did not create anti-Japanese sentiment, but was a product of already structured racist
ideology where the Japanese threatened Peru’s hierarchy.
Right-wing politics in Peru was dominated by a generation of intellectuals who
identified race within the scope of scientific politics. Race became a crucial component
of nation building and the concept of Idealism rampant among Peruvian intellectual
circles. Idealismo sought to construct the best version of leadership and authority in
Peru for nation building, attributing an importance to education and an enhancement the
morality of the Peruvian body. Intellectuals in Peru intertwined scientific construction of
race while also accepting racial hierarchy as partly established by intellectual and moral
difference.95 Separating undesirable from model Peruvian came to be termed as
constructing “gente decente.”96 Intellectual Vega Centeno described these perfect
persons as, “those that have reached a greater physical as well as psychic
development, those who have completed their total evolution, thus possessing the
culture required to promote social happiness.”97 More discussion of intellectual antiJapanese sentiment comes later in this chapter, with more concentrated attention on
the connection between eugenics, ‘yellow peril’ reproduction, and militarism.
The working-class in Peru eschewed the Japanese primarily because they were
viewed as working in the informal sector, mostly retail vendors, and not the industrial or
artisan jobs in Lima. Framed as vicious capitalists replacing Peruvian workers with
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Japanese, in reality the Japanese operated their businesses with the similar proportions
of native Peruvian workers as Peruvian businesses employed foreigners. Significant to
the discussion of Japanese women and the fear they brought to the Peruvian
population, Peru’s labor unions were alarmed that Japanese employed women in their
workforce, considered an emphatic insult to the Peruvian working-class male population
being replaced by a foreigner, and a female.98
The organized working class in Peru used the exclusionary sentiment directed at
the Japanese as a method to earn nationalist credentials from the ruling Unión
Revolucionaria fascist party under president Luis Sánchez Cerro’s leadership.99 With a
Peruvian economy dominated by alliances with foreign capital, they intersected their
nationalist economic policy with nationalist xenophobic sentiment. After decades of
marginalization by the Peruvian oligarchy, the working class movement used
xenophobia to assert their claim on Peru as their country. Accusing the Asian
population of blame for unemployment and being a “bought” workforce became
commonplace, as one newspaper derided them as “the murderers of our people, the
thieves of our bread.”100
In response to Japanese success in economic circles, various Peruvian labor
unions attacked the Japanese financially, but also were conditioned by racist ideologies
motivating the intellectual sector of Peruvian society. They cast down many reformed
labels and derogatory sentiments previously attributed to the Chinese unto the
Japanese. The labor union Estrella del Peru exemplified how their economic
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grievances against the Japanese were underlined by racist and eugenic ideology
rampant at the time. Positing the Japanese bakeries against Italian bakeries, whom
were the true monopolizers of the bakery industry, Estrella del Peru accused the
Japanese of exploitation while defending the Italian bakeries for treating the Peruvian
public with greater respect.101 Estrella del Peru accused the Japanese of “monopolizing
all the work” and were an “all-absorbing and despotic race,” despite the fact that the
Peruvians owned 19 bakeries in Lima while foreigners owned 11.102 They ignored the
fact that other races owned the 11 bakeries also, primarily the Italians, focusing their
assault specifically on the Japanese.
Even the middle-class contributed to anti-Japanese action and policy, as
demonstrated by the activity of Ernesto Clermont, a small business owner of a car
dealership. He produced and widely dispersed the first published copies of the
infamous Anti-Asia newspaper, believing the newspaper’s purpose was to protect “the
racial rights and integrity of the Peruvian nation.”103 Clermont feared how the Japanese
ascended social hierarchies in Peru to come to occupy the same status on the social
ladder as other middle-class Peruvians like himself.104 He even instigated boycotts of
Asian stores, and chastised working-class Peruvians who did not adhere to such a
policy as committing criminal treason.105
Whether in economic working class or intellectual circles, or even the middleclass of Peru, factions of Peru separated widely on social and class hierarchy,
101

Moore, 163.
Expediente Pampa Lara, 10 February 1921, Legajo 1, Ministerio de Fomento,
Expedientes Laborales, Case #13, AGN. As cited in Moore, 163.
103 Anti-Asia, December 1, 1930, 19.
104 Moore, 221.
105 Anti-Asia December 1, 1930, 8, 13.
102

51

Peruvians united against the Japanese through discourse on their threat to racial
destiny. A threat to Peru’s racial hierarchy and Peruvianization of their population
hoping to identify as a dominant european-ethnic white nation, all Japanese
discrimination was underlined by such racialization.

American Policy informs Leguía
On the surface the 1920’s period in Peru offered some general protection for
Japanese status in Peru. Even while eugenic and racial discourse permeated
intellectual circles, the dominant makeup of the Peruvian State during this period,
President Leguía still fostered some policy in favor of the Japanese. In 1921, Leguía
instituted the first resident minister in Peru from Tokyo, Seisaburo Shimzu, in theory
assisting communication between Japan and their nationals in Peru.106 After the
termination of immigrant work-contract system in 1923, Leguía pursued a renegotiated
treaty between Japan and Peru, containing two articles relevant to the Japanese. The
first outlined that peace and amity between Japan and Peru extended beyond the
nation-states to the subjects and citizens residing in both countries, something never
formally declared in any Peruvian law.107 The other article declared that all pursuits in
every sector of the Peruvian workforce were required to equate Japanese with any
other subjects or citizens from European or North American nations.108 These simplistic
declarations provided hope, but no practical usage to the Japanese, as the treaty was
not ratified until 1930, the year that Leguía lost power, and the Japanese lost their
biggest political proponent.
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Leguía’s admiration for the Japanese became increasingly hollow as his strong
relationship with the United States developed into the defining element preceding his
downfall. In many ways, his preference for U.S relations over his position as ‘regia san’
to the Japanese community stabilized the Pan-American regime of anti-Japanese action
and rightlessness. Obsessive over the United States’ aggressive capitalist model and
ascending military, Leguía sought to Americanize Peru, embracing American business
interests, which he viewed as mutually beneficial to both nations.109 He was committed
to allying Peru with America’s exploding 1920’s economy, generating astronomical
foreign debt and placing Peru’s economy at the mercy of United States’ interests.
The most weighing contradiction of the Leguía era was how his pro-American
alliance forced him into a complicated position concerning his pro-Japanese identity.
After the 1924 Immigration Act in the United States, Leguía found it increasingly difficult
to support the Japanese in Peru, wavering in many assertions he delivered to his
Japanese supporters and business partners. Immediately following the passage of the
Immigration Act he lamented to the U.S State department that the Japanese were
unwelcome and unpopular, but internally reassured his restless Japanese resident
minister and other Japanese business connections that the act did not influence
Peru.110 For the rest of his dictatorship he consistently leaned toward his new American
ally, slowly breaking down diplomacy with Japan and tempering his support of the
Japanese community in Peru. His ousting in 1930 by the military was unopposed, as
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the Peruvian public was hopeful for a return to Peruvian interests over foreign
exploitation, but the established ties to the United States proved impossible to break.
His role in beginning Japanese emigration and his perceived identity as ‘regia
san’ was overshadowed by the legacy he left behind after his 1930 ousting. The
Japanese were now in their most vulnerable position since their 1899 arrival, undesired
by the dominant caste groups in Peru and at the mercy of an oppressive nationalist
State. Leguía began the trend of Pan-Americanism specific to Peru, commencing the
era of an authoritative American presence over Peruvian Japanese policies, primarily
immigration and citizenship status regulations. An alleged fighter for working-class and
middle-class Peru, his deference to American capital interests and perceived proJapanese inclinations angered his support base. As stated, the working-class in Peru
viewed the Japanese as perpetrators of Peruvian failure to nationalize the working-class
economy.
Leguía’s successors and opponents latched onto his pro-Japanese platform to
advance their nationalist interests as they sought to consolidate power in another
military coup d ‘eat in 1930. The attempts at reforming the treaty with the Japan, initially
constructed to offer the first legislative protections for the Japanese residents in Peru,
failed, relegating Japanese ‘status’ malleable for the oppressive administrations to
follow. The benevolent ruler had ushered in a new era for the Japanese in Peru, as one
Washington official working in Lima noted in State records in 1924, “The question of
further Asiatic immigration to…Peru will depend largely on the action taken by the
Government of the United States.”111 This assertion extended not just to immigration,
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but also to restricting the status of the Peruvian-born Japanese with Peruvian
citizenship, the Nisei generation which caused the most anxiety for the Peruvian State.
Restricting mobility, therefore, returned as the dominant marker of JapanesePeruvian relations. During the 1930’s period Japanese mobility within Peru was defined
by containment policies hoping to curtail Japanese ascension in business and
naturalization of citizenship, as Japan’s increasing imperial and militaristic presence
threatened all Japanese nationals abroad. Intertwining the Japanese in Peru with the
aggression of their home nation became an influential intersection proliferated in
propaganda issued by both the United States and Peru, justifying the need for
restricting Japanese status and unimpeded surveillance. Even as Japan started to take
interest in their people abroad, legal measures halted the issuing of Japanese passports
in attempts to end immigration and restrict Japanese rights to status and citizenship.
This reconfiguring of Japanese identity through a legal approach to fit the illusionary
climate of ‘hemispheric security’ was a direct response by the Peruvian State to policies
imposed by the United States in the 1920’s. as Peru’s Pan-American containment policy
against the Japanese modeled U.S measures.

Modeling American Exclusion- Transferring U.S Measures into the
Peruvian System
Just before his removal from political power, President Leguía decreed in 1930,
“Confraternity among the American nations must be estimated as permanent basis of
their development and greatness.”112 Even earlier, before the Immigration Act of 1924,
sectors of the Peruvian Congress exhibited the desire to end Japanese immigration. In
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the early 1920’s a Peruvian anti-Asian immigration bill was proposed, but met with
tentative support and failed to pass. Minister Shichita Tatsuke, a double-duty diplomat
primarily serving Chile but also a figure in Peru, staunchly addressed the Peruvian
Foreign Office, repudiating many of the accusations directed at the Japanese, one of
few administrators to disprove the concept of Japanese ‘degeneration’.113 While the
proposal failed to pass, this early crusade against the Japanese showed how Peru
desired to restrict Japanese immigration even before the passing of the American
Immigration Act in 1924. Peruvian State records show that the foreign office was
hesitant in it’s response to the letter, acknowledging receipt but failing to concur or
adopt official opinion toward the bill, illuminating the anti-Japanese discourse existing in
the foreign office, the most significant branch of the State pertaining to Japanese status
in Peru.114
The inspiration from the United States on Peru’s growing anti-Japanese climate,
already rampant among the public and growing in government, almost led to an abrupt
analogous bill to the 1924 U.S Act as U.S-Japanese relations completely deteriorated.
The Peruvian and American consuls in Japan exchanged copies of the American
legislation restricting Japanese immigration to the United States on instructions from
Lima.115 Peru was curious as to the response of the U.S in the event that Peru banned
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Japanese immigration as well, hoping to gauge U.S willingness to ally should Japan
threaten Peru, citing the Monroe Doctrine as a justification for U.S interest.116
The regia san, Leguía, behind closed doors, exemplified his leaning to U.S
interests against his public pro-Japanese stance. State records show Leguía first
responded the passage of the 1924 Act by asking the United States to revise the new
exclusion law. When they refused, it was here Leguía stated the Japanese “unpopular
and unwelcome” despite his statements to Japan’s legation over the course of his
presidency, and his influential role in founding Japanese immigration.117 Leguía then
lamented the fact that Peru could not develop an exclusion law against the Japanese,
citing that excluding them without U.S support could mean war. He further pledged his
allegiance to the U.S model, hinting that a pledge from the United States could lead to
joint action by the Latin governments against the Japanese, even dropping suspicion
that his resident Japanese minister Shimizu visited Chile to explore Japanese naval
base expansion.118 That suspicion was unfounded, and cast doubt on Leguía’s
assertions, and while the U.S did not pledge full support, it did deliver the infamous
declaration already noted, “The question of further Asiatic immigration to…Peru will
depend largely on the action taken by the Government of the United States.119
Following the pattern of discrimination in the settlement and labor-contract era
from 1899-1923, practical anti-Japanese policy in Peru in the late 1920’s and 1930’s
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began with economic targeting of Japanese influence. In 1928, Peruvians failed to
enforce an Article of the Cabotage Law which permitted Japanese cargo boats to
operate under equal export rights and fees as Peruvian import ships.120 When it came to
Japanese-produced and imported medicine, a necessity for the Peruvian population as
a whole, the Peruvian government placed higher taxes on the Japanese import than
those sanctioned on European imports.121 At the time Japan-Peru diplomatic relations
were starting to deteriorate as Peru’s administration increasingly leaned toward the
United States as a more stable ally. However, social animosity between the Japanese
migrants in Peru and the native Peruvians was also heightened during this period, as
the worldwide depression devastated the Peruvian working class. The Japanese
remained relatively unscathed, which fostered strong animosity toward the Japanese
because of their economic insularity. The Peruvian government responded with
economic action against the nation of Japan as a retaliatory response for the mounting
hostilities perceived to be instigated by the Japanese at the ground level of Peru.
Economic legislation quickly was replaced with widespread racialized containment
policies to resist Japanese influence in Peru.

Connecting United States Model to Peru-Pan America
The Peruvian administration’s national processes did not grow in isolation, and
were always influenced by the mounting presence of American ideology in their own
racial affairs. During the interwar period, American relations across both nation-states
became obsessive over the concept of Pan-American or hemispheric unity. Beginning
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by forging relationships based on economic commonalities in trade, soon Pan-American
ideology was defined by a united perspective of security against threats posed by unAmerican others. Looking at some of the Pan-American conferences, and general
correspondence between the United States and Peru, evidenced how the measures
implemented in America against the Japanese began to trickle into Peruvian
consciousness, and eventually, Peruvian legislation restricting the rights of the
threatening, growing Japanese population.
The concept of an Inter-American conference to discuss and stimulate
cooperation and collective interests between nations of the two American continents
dated back to the era of revolution in South America. Simón Bolívar, in particular,
voiced his approval of creating a regional system of cooperation in the Americas to
protect against any future European imperialism. This is important solely because it
shows how the concept of PanAmericanism from its initial creation until the World War II
period was predominantly based in protecting against threats. While a few conferences
occurred, the late 19th century and early 20th primarily pitted the United States and its
Latin counterparts against each other, in constant tension over territory, as the United
States acted imperially in coordination with the tenets of the Monroe Doctrine. This led
to widespread mistrust of the American menace, and tempered any progression
towards unified inter-American ideology for most of the century until after the First World
War.
In the interwar period the Pan-American conferences served as a medium for the
United States to impose their ideology on national and hemispheric security, and
foreigners, upon the American Republics. By establishing the ‘good neighbor’ policy in
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the early conferences, when wartime approached in the late 1930’s, the U.S created the
platform to align security interests, which helped facilitate the conjoined effort between
Peru and the United States to eradicate Japanese influence from their respective
territories.
Between 1920 and 1945 five official conferences between the American
Republics took place, along with three special conventions responding to wartime. The
first conference in 1923 (Chile) recognized a Pan-American treaty, codified in the
League of Nations Treaty Series, which obliged all the American States to refrain from
conflict with one another.122 In 1933 at Uruguay, Secretary of State and head of the
American delegation Cordell Hull announced the new era of good neighbor policy. He
stated the 1930’s to be, “….The beginning of a great new era of great renaissance in
American cooperative effort to promote our entire material, moral, and spiritual affairs
and to erect an edifice of peace that will endure forever.”123 Roosevelt’s ‘good neighbor
policy’ went into full effect, interlocking Latin American policy to the United States for the
foreseeable future, and eventual wartime period. This early proclamation by Cordell
Hull remains vague, but anti-Japanese sentiment and action certainly qualified as part
of the promotion of a united Pan-American moral concept and the idea to secure peace
from Japanese threat.
In 1936, the United States orchestrated an emergency conference with growing
tensions escalating across the globe. Until this conference, security interests at the
conferences predominantly centered on inter-American relations and conflict. The
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emergency conference in Buenos Aires became the first time in the Pan-American
conference era where the delegates from Latin America were called upon to consider
security against non-American States.
In the preamble of a United States treaty proposed by Secretary of State Cordell
Hull, the U.S outlined interdependence between the continents in the event of
emergencies that affect their common interests. When the common interest later
involved the repudiation and deprivation of Japanese and their rights, deemed security
threats in their respective continents, the United States reverted to the hemispheric
security platform that began formally at this emergency Pan-American conference. The
Consultation Pact, the signature legislation adopted at the Buenos Aires Peace
Conference, included one set of contingencies that stated, “In the event that the peace
of the Americas is menaced from any source,” using a term, menace, infamously and
widely associated with the Japanese during the period.124 As John Mecham, historian
of inter-American relations, asserted, while a spokesman for the U.S delegation claimed
this statement only covered threats of catastrophic war, it was certainly phrased in
terms to provide consultation for any substantial threat to hemispheric security.125 The
Lima conference in 1938 offered few changes to instituted measures, but did widen the
scope of the Consultation from Buenos Aires, adding, “the security and territorial
integrity of any American Republic.”126 Broadening the scope allowed future
manipulation of the Pan-American concepts to enable action against threats from
foreigners in Latin American lands.
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While the principal declarations of the conferences addressed unilateral
response to war aggression, a few ‘minor’ resolutions adopted in Lima in 1938 more
poignantly concerned the Japanese in Latin America. The Lima Declaration included a
tenet calling for common action against subversive activities.127 Brazil, along with Peru
home to the highest percentage of Japanese and other axis nationals, brought forth a
resolution on ‘foreign minorities,’ declaring, “Residents who, according to domestic law
are considered aliens, cannot claim collectively, the condition of minorities.”128 Another
resolution adopted, titled “Political Activities of Foreigners,” endorsed the governments
of the American Republics to prohibit aliens from exercising political rights conferred by
the laws of their respective countries.129 Overshadowed by the fears of crisis in Europe
and the Pacific, the Pan American conferences maintained an awareness of the
potential threat posed by immigrants from the fascist nations residing within their own
boundaries. This also demonstrated that future Peruvian and American restrictions
imposed on their Japanese populations did not operate in a vacuum, but were part of
the Pan-American regime of anti-Japanese security policy and deprivation of rights.
Pan-America provided the foundation aligning security ideology, but the
American legal model appropriated and modele in Peru most clearly paved the way
toward facilitating Japanese deportation and incarceration. The next section discusses
the ramifications of the Pan-American regime of anti-Japanese ideology on the
Japanese in Peru. American exclusionary policies in the 1920’s led to a parallel system
of restrictions levied against the Japanese in Peru in the 1930’s, as the country went
127
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through a phase of sweeping nationalism after 1930. Without the precedents from the
United States eagerly followed by Peruvian administration as they imagined a nation
without their Japanese demographic, the expulsion and incarceration of the Japanese in
the Americas might not have extended to Peru, and remained confined to the boundary
of the United States.

The 1930’s-Peru’s Anti-Japanese Escalation
When Luis Sánchez Cerro toppled Leguía and came to power, the revolutionary
upheaval led to permissible incidents of violence and pillage against the Japanese in
Lima. Acts of violence and property damage occurred, with Japanese shops specifically
targeted and looted. The Japanese minister at the time, Saburo Kurusu, appointed by
Leguía, asked for the approval of Japanese armed vigilance groups to help protect the
Japanese communities.130 While they succeeded in ending upheaval in the revolution
aftermath, they helped foster a growing fear already proliferating throughout Peru: that
the Japanese in Peru and militarism were deeply intertwined. Already a subject of
journalistic attack, media transitioned to align firmly with the Peruvian State and public
in their anti-Japanese stance. This served as a precursor to fomenting anti-Japanese
legislation, intimately connecting anti-Japanese sentiment from the people to State
policy through the newspaper medium. In addition, the Great Depression facilitated
further anti-Japanese sentiment, as the native Peruvians branded the Japanese as both
instigators of Peru’s economic problems, and also mysteriously coping well with it.

130

Gardiner, The Japanese In Peru, 49.
63

State department correspondence actually indicated that Peru’s economy was
one of the least affected by the Great Depression.131 Peruvians unfairly displaced their
malcontent onto the Japanese, who they perceived as coping well with the depression
effects due to Japanese government assistance.132 In reality, Japan always maintained
a laissez-faire approach to the Japanese in Peru, and the devastating effects of the
depression meant Japan was in no position to divert resources to the Japanese in Latin
America. Overreacting to Peruvian accusations, the Peruvian government restricted
ownership and operation of businesses by foreigners in Peru in 1932 and 1933. John
K. Emmerson, American diplomat and later leading figure in the deportation process,
described this as the beginning of the infamous 80% law that ravaged the Japanese
communities organically built economy of small local retail business.133 The law
declared that 80% of all Peruvian businesses be owned by native Peruvians. When
confronted with Japanese presence intensifying in the nation-state economy, like land
tax reforms aimed at the Japanese in the U.S, Peru attacked Japanese economic
stability. Blaming the Japanese for economic problems, while simultaneously stipulating
policy to restrict their economic growth, were defining pillars of the Pan-American antiJapanese regime.
The same year the Immigration Act of 1924 passed in the United States, the
Japanese-Peruvian treaty in 1924 was negotiated. Already mentioned, this treaty
professed for “perpetual peace and amity between their respective subjects in
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citizens.”134 However, the treaty was not ratified and officially enacted until 1930, when
the impending regime change signified the start of a darker period for the Japanese in
Peru. Annulled in 1934, the treaty operated for just under four years. In justifying the
condemnation of the treaty, Peruvian foreign officials cited Japanese espionage in high
proportions of their involvement in Peru’s economy, rigidity in Japanese orders from
their mysterious and secluded community organizations, secret mobilizations of people,
and channeling funds illegally from Peru to Japan.135 Just a few years earlier, at the
beginning of President Oscar Benavides reign, the Peruvian constitution was modified
concerning naturalization by adding the phrase “that they renounce their nationality.”136
Long concerned with the concept of dual citizenship, as Japanese militarism spread
globally, the Peruvian State aspired for stronger loyalty to Peru.
Peru viewed State policy as far too lenient on Japanese naturalization and dual
citizenship process. Even without proper evidence, just requesting naturalization itself
was met with immediate suspicion, and the laws considered too vague. One
congressman stated,
The idea of awarding nationality to a foreigner, so that person exercises the
same rights that the Peruvians do, especially those who are from a race that
does not tend to better our hygiene or our population, I think is a little
dangerous…Peru needs to invigorate its race, transform it and have a perfectly
healthy people, something that is not going to happen with other races which are
congenitally degenerated.137
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He further feared that allowing naturalization after just two years of residence, as
permitted in the Peruvian Constitution, was far too short a span to establish firm
allegiances.138
The Japanese faced scrutiny for their interest in naturalization, while other races
found their motives never questioned. Chuhei Kato Kawai’s naturalization story
supported this notion. He applied for naturalization after more than twenty years of
living in Peru, owning a drugstore, and with children born in Peru. In his application he
added the necessary note that he was also naturalizing because of the affection he
maintained for Peru.139 The chief of the Social Affairs Brigade charged with
investigating applications in his region refused to offer Kato a good conduct report,
stating he was not naturalizing out of love for Peru, but simply out of fear for antiforeigner laws. This occurred despite the fact this particular chief wielded little absolute
power, representing how almost any official in authority could deter naturalizations
largely at his discretion.140 This evidenced the extreme obstacles faced by the

ciertas razas. Vemos también que en el Perú las razas asiáticas, tienen la tendencia de
abordar a este país con gran intensidad. Por consiguiente, yo creo, que debe
especificarse este artículo a los extranjeros que reúnan las condiciones necesarias
para vigorizar al país. Posiblemente, mi idea es un poco vaga, porque yo soy muy
respetuoso al derecho que asiste a todos los extranjeros, pero eso de dar la
nacionalidad a un extranjero, para que venga a ejercer los mismos derechos que los
nacionales especialmente a los de una raza que no tiende a mejorar nuestro estado
higiénico ni a mejorar nuestra población, yo creo que es un poco peligroso...presento
este punto de vista, que lo tomo en homenaje a que el Perú tiene necesidad de
vigorizar su raza, transformarla y tener un pueblo perfectamente sano, cosa que no
sucede con otras razas congénitamente degeneradas
138
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Japanese seeking naturalization in the few times it was legally permitted during the
1930’s.

Influence of Brazil
Pan-American influences on Peru also came from neighboring countries in Latin
America. Aside from the United States, the legislation that most affected Peru was from
Brazil, the other Latin country with a high population of Japanese. The Brazilian
Constitution, enacted on July 16, 1934, stipulated that the number of immigrants
entering from a given country would be restricted to a yearly maximum of 2% the total
number that such country sent to Brazil from the last fifty years.141 The parameters set
by the Brazilian Constitution echoed those found in the U.S 1924 Act. Since the United
States established immigration quotas all but abolishing Japanese immigration, most of
these Japanese pivoted their interest to Brazil and Peru as prospective destinations. In
the year following the 1924 Act, Brazil saw a 137% increase in Japanese
immigration.142 The Immigration Act of 1924 undoubtedly pushed more Japanese to
Latin America, creating heightened anti-Japanese paranoia in both countries. Peru
especially feared the quota set by Brazil, knowing that with the United States and Brazil
imposing bans, Peru became the premier target for Japanese migrants, dreading a
substantial increase in their immigration flow.

Peruvian Immigration Law and Final Status Restrictions before War
All these matters culminated in the Peruvian Immigration Law of 1936, the most
severe of all anti-Japanese measures to date. The decree posed many significant
issues, many of them mirror policies of the immigration laws compromising the
141
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Japanese populations in the United States and Brazil. Annual immigration could not
exceed sixteen thousand or about two-tenths of one percent of population or two per
1,000, and foreign residents who returned to Japan and then hoped to reenter Peru
were now included in the quotas.143 When they returned they had to record their
departure for Japan on their passports, which became a hallmark of presumed militancy
and Japanese education and a red flag in naturalization processes.144 Surveillance on
the movement of the Japanese via their passports served as feasible justifications to
deny or remove citizenship. Only Japanese who reported they were already married at
the time of passport examination could send for their wives from Japan, predicated with
proof they could financially support them, before Peru permitted their entry under the
restrictive quota. The infamous 80% law, when first imposed only affected small
businesses, but now expanded to include all enterprises in any profession run by
foreigners. Regulations were imposed on selling or transferring business operations to
another foreigner, a direct response to Issei Japanese hoping to transfer their business
ventures to Peruvian-born Nisei Japanese. The law went into effect in June of 1936,
leading to many Japanese in Peru to hastily attempt to quickly process naturalization, at
the time legal. Upset with this loophole, the Peruvian State authorized a new decree in
July of 1936 suspending authorization of naturalizations.145 Further follow up legislation
extended the reentry provision to include the Japanese who were born in Peru,
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removing the stability offered by birthright citizenship, as the growing Nisei population
posed a significant threat to Peru’s racial hegemony.146
The jus soli and jus sanguinis concepts, meaning citizenship through place of
birth and through descent from parents respectively, greatly disturbed the ruling
nationalist and intellectual leaders in the Peruvian State. As evidenced by later
discussion of eugenic influences on Peru’s concept of racial destiny, nothing worried the
Peruvian State and public more than an unregulated Nisei population. From their
perspective, double nationality or dual citizenship merely acted as a smokescreen for
hidden allegiance to Japan, even if no concrete evidence ever existed to justify such
beliefs. Fed up with the growing population, Peru decreed further legislation stating,
“persons born in Peru of foreign parents…who during their minority, leave Peru for their
parent’s homeland…automatically lose their Peruvian citizenship, and, must be
considered as alien immigrants.”147 A few months later the Peruvian State accentuated
their attack on dual citizenship and birthright, passing a law that stated, “the sons of
foreigners, even if born in Peru, are during their minority to be considered as being the
same nationality as their fathers.148
From the fall of the Leguía presidency and the nationalism phase until the brink
of the Pearl Harbor attack on the United States, Peru elected to measure its legislative
response to a growing Japanese population correspondent to the United States model.
The Pan-American model of exclusion culminated in wide-scale immigration restriction,

146

Ibid.
J.F Normano and Gerbi Antonello. The Japanese in South America: An Introductory
Survey with Special Reference to Peru. (New York: John Day Company, 1943),
76-77.
148 Ibid.
147

69

while also limiting the Japanese role in the economy and Japanese rights for both
Japanese nationals and Nisei citizens born in Peru. While the incarceration period
forthcoming from 1941-1945 can feasibly be attributed to wartime paranoia, both
countries preoccupation with Japanese exclusionary policy predated the expansion of
Japan as a wartime threat. Perceiving the Japanese as an ‘other’ was a dominant
theme of Pan-American model of hemispheric security. While legislative and economic
restrictions were enacted separately in Peru and the United States, the forces that
motivated them did not exist independently, but as a cohesive program to institute a
regime of rightlessness across the Americas. Before facilitating their move to a
rightless space, the Peruvian and American regime designated the Japanese as
personae non-gratae, undesirables in the Western hemisphere. As will be seen, this
regime was deemed necessary for security, but it’s underlying justification was defined
by protecting “racial destiny” from a Japanese race that posed the threat of potential
“racial suicide” in Peru.

Pan-American Eugenics Conferences.
As eugenics grew nationally in Peru and the United States, it was also becoming
a Pan American affair. Two conferences were held during the interwar period, called
the Pan American Conferences of Eugenics and Homiculture, the first held in 1927, and
the second in 1934. Even before the Pan American eugenics era, an international
forum was held in London in 1912, and New York in 1921. The central debate for the
American conferences centered on a unifying proposal between all the Pan-American
nations concerning eugenics policy, the Pan American Code of Eugenics. As scholar
Leys Stepan correctly claimed, “Eugenics…was more than a set of national programs
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embedded in national debates; it was also part of international relations. 149 As Pan
Americanism was primarily the idea of the United States, so to was Pan American
eugenics.
Stepan noted that American eugenics possessed more extremities in terms of
reductive and racial-reproductive positions, deeming U.S eugenics inherently more
intransigently racist than the Latins.150 This demonstrated further evidence of the U.S
imposing ideology on the Latin countries, and how it was of great importance for the
United States to both stimulate the development of eugenics in Latin America, and to
incorporate it into their system of eugenic influence. As the Pan American Conference
on eugenics first opened in 1927, it became clear that immigration was the centerpiece
for debates, as the 1924 immigration law and its eugenic aspects provoked
considerable discussion.151 The coda proposed by the United States was extreme,
calling for free migration only for individuals classified as germinally good and
somatically responsible, and proposed the right for each nation to establish social
measures to conserve racial purity.152 Dr. Domingo y Ramos, delegate leader from
Cuba and the most American aligned Latin counterpart, classified the white race as
superior, and called for the Latin Americans to imitate the United States on issue of
immigration and race linked to eugenic policies. He even went as far as threatening the
Latin Americans if they did not take action, stating the United States would set eugenic
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and other quotas for Latin Americans trying to enter the U.S, something previously
reassured as unfavorable by the Americans after the 1924 Act passed.153
While a revised and compromised coda passed during the two Pan American
Eugenic conferences, overall a unified ideology on eugenics was deterred by
disagreements over the intricacies of the proposal. However, the forcefulness and
imposing figure of the United States on Latin American racial and immigration policies
was on full display. For the purpose of this thesis argument, the Pan American
conferences served as a bridge between the scientific sphere of United States and
Peruvian racial ideology. As extreme nationalism swept Peru during the 1930’s and led
to imposing restrictive measures on Japanese rights, the designation of the Japanese
as unfit for Peru’s racial destiny was already infused into Peruvian consciousness in
part because of shared eugenic ideology through these conferences. A realistic fear of
Japanese hypersexuality, their reproductive capacity, and therefore, the proliferation of
a new generation of Japanese children underlined anti-Japanese restrictive measures.
Their economic exploits and perceived attentiveness to Japanese growing militarism
established fear of the ‘yellow peril.’ Nevertheless, no Japanese-related fear permeated
the consciousness of United States and Peru more than the fear of white racial destiny
corrupted by uncontrollable reproduction of Japanese on their soil, with those Japanese
undeservedly receiving American and Peruvian citizenship status. This terror of an
increased Japanese body greatly influenced their path to rightlessness during the
interwar period, partly contributed to the decision to incarcerate them, and can only be
understood with the backdrop of Pan-American eugenic ideology.
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The Underlying Discourse Stimulating Anti-Japanese SentimentEugenic Ideology and Sexualization
Establishing racial ideology parallel to United States ideology during the interwar
period was integral for a Peru hopeful for a strong western ally, and meant that
eugenics played a role in this regime of rightlessness against the Japanese in Peru.
Integral to solidifying the racial hierarchy desired by the Peruvian elite was the
construction of indigenismo counter posed against the Japanese menace. President
Leguía’s ruling period from 1919-1930 glorified the indigenous population of Peru in
official rhetoric, representing them as the foundation of the nation and the hallmark of
the mixed-race body that dominated Peruvian society.154 The rhetoric only carried so
far, as scholars noted that this did not translate into providing the indigenous Peruvians
equal political and economic rights.155 Nonetheless, the eugenics movement in Peru did
accommodate a space for the indigenous population, praising their cultural heritage
while deeming them redeemable if they assimilated to modern Peruvian society.156 This
positivist approach, albeit still marred in white supremacist racism, was never afforded
to the Japanese, considered inassimilable and degenerative.
Still, as indigenismo became an accepted current for the modern Peruvian race
during the 1920’s, everyone from intellectuals to the officials in Peruvian State remained
inclined to European-ethnic immigration. Prominent intellectual Mario E. del Rio wrote,
“It is imperative then, given the indications of a true emergency, that a million white
immigrants come as soon as possible to serve as the foundation for crossing with our
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race…”157 He forcefully argued that Peru’s economic, social, and cultural progress and
ascent to modernism depended on such crossing. Stephanie Carol Moore cited how
Del Rio’s popular dissertation gained publication support from more than eleven
prominent congressmen, including the brother of President Leguía.158
Just as the Japanese filled the role of the antagonist when the worldwide
depression flattened Peru’s working-class, they also quickly filled the gap left by the
indigenismo movement as the absolute problem related to Peru’s racial order. With
such a large percentage of mestizos in Peru during the interwar period, heightening
focus on the differences between Japanese and Peruvians became more feasible than
attributing blame to the indigenous who, uncomfortably, possessed native Peruvian
background. As nationalism swept the nation after Leguía’s fall in 1930, the concept of
Peruvian culture and the Peruvian “man” became prominent race debates. Military and
Fascist president Óscar R. Benavides (1933-1939) and his Foreign Minister Alberto
Ulloa y Sotomayor were known eugenic supporters, who in their infamous 1936 antiJapanese immigration decree noted favoritism toward the physical, moral, and social
perfection of the population.159 Cited in an article from mainstream Lima newspaper La
Prensa, a congressmen wrote, “…Our aborigine should not mix with the yellow race
because this cross does not better us, either physically or morally…”160 As frequently
common in nationalism across the globe, affirming the perfect race and aligning it with
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the national customs and traditions of a culture could only be stable and ingrained in
society with the presence of a racial ‘other.’ To protect and stabilize nationalism and a
rightful population, there must always exist a presence of those undeserving of rights.
Always a thorn to Peruvian hegemony, the eugenics era and the veiled
indigenismo movement combined in the 1930’s to stabilize the Japanese firmly at the
bottom of racial social hierarchy in Peru. As always, while operating under nation-state
rhetoric and movement, this rising crisis of degeneration on the part of the Japanese
was influenced by similar movements existing in the United States, and delivered to
Latin America through the Pan-American system of racial rightlessness, justified with a
eugenic and scientific tone. A crucial factor of the regime of rightlessness gaining
political support in Peru throughout the interwar period was how eugenics positioned
Japanese women. Disseminating the threat posed by Japanese women and
reproduction gained support in Peru and became an integral factor in creating a wider
gap between the rights the native Peruvians should possess versus those given by birth
to Nisei Peruvian Japanese. The wider this gap extended between the Japanese and
the native Peruvians concerning rights, the easier it would be to remove them from
society when wartime period arrived and helped facilitate such deportations.
A hypersexualized view of the Japanese women in Peru dated back decades.
Males constituted more than 90% of the first Issei settling period in Peru from 18991923.161 The Peruvian State’s response to this phenomenon was colored in
contradiction. The State, press, and Peruvian masses first latched onto the
disproportioned rate of sex for the Japanese as another instance of their inability to
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assimilate, or their isolationist nature. This placed the Japanese in a difficult space, for
immigration regulations during the period stymied the capacity to bring additional family
members smoothly at affordable cost, but the Peruvians despised the image of a
Japanese man with a Peruvian woman. Early in this plantation settlement era,
plantation supervisors were quick to placate blame on Japanese women, and how their
shortage drove the Japanese males into recklessness. They attributed any relations
between Japanese men and Peruvian women as ‘evils’ and started to make concerted
efforts with emigration companies to intently focus on bringing more married men.162
The Japanese Issei men intended their first voyages to Peru to be temporary, but soon
discovered their low wages and a corrupted system of deductions to pay for eventual
return passage to Japan forced extended stays. They were stuck in an isolation cycle,
able to work and earn enough to maintain their life in Peru, but unable to save enough
to return to Japan with better fortunes and find wives. When emigration companies and
plantation managers wished for more married, stable lives for their Japanese men, the
Issei faced limited options. Cultural racism disallowed them from engaging in relations
with Peruvians, forcing them to increasingly turn to the “Picture Bride” system moving
into the 1920’s.
The “Picture Bride” system meant marrying Japanese women while residing in
Peru, and the Japanese government ratified ‘calling’ for them once the marriage was
approved. It served as one of the only solutions for the Japanese men due to Peruvian
hostile reaction to their isolation; ironic since Peru’s corrupt labor system was to blame
for the Japanese inability to nurture families in Peru. However, as soon as the “Picture
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Bride” system was enacted, the Peruvian State attacked the Japanese for such an
‘unnatural’ marriage practice. One Peruvian writer exclaimed it evidenced Japanese
“obscure cultural practices” and “strange Japanese marriage practices.”163 He
continued, “When there are no marriageable Japanese women available, young
Japanese bachelors find their wives through ‘sweet-heart ships’ which bring Japanese
girls in groups of 50 to 100 smilingly greet their husbands even without having met them
before.”164 Wrought with ignorance of the Peruvian liability in restricting the Japanese
settlers to such a method, this statement also provided insight into the Peruvian
objectification of Japanese women, perceived as lacking any human character and
simply sexual bodies for the Japanese males. This objectification became integral to
affirming Japanese women’s role in spreading the Japanese threat, attacking the
Japanese women for their role in degenerating the Peruvian race because of the
perceived nature of their sexuality and reproductive capacity.
How the Peruvian State, press, and public viewed Japanese women was parallel
to their perspective toward the “Picture Brides.” Census figures show, albeit prone to
statistical misrepresentations, that the majority of Japanese female immigrants to Peru
between 1923 and 1940 were “Picture Brides.” Knowing this, we can infer that the
“Picture Bride” stereotype and negative image was the premier perception of any
Japanese woman by the Peruvian public and State. Worth observation, in the United
States, the infamous Gentlemen’s Agreement of 1907 and 1908, unofficially restricting
Japanese labor immigration, left an opening for the Japanese men to ‘call’ for wives in
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Japan. Backfiring on the desire of American administration, this greatly balanced the
Japanese population in the United States, and changed Japanese structure in the
America from labor factions to full-fledged family communities. A similar trajectory
occurred in Peru, where when the labor contract era ended in 1923, an influx of women
balanced the Japanese Peruvian population. At first distraught over the isolated nature
of the Japanese men from 1899-1923, the Peruvian State now shifted perspective,
deterred by the growth of the Japanese community and the birth of next generation
Japanese within Peruvian boundaries. Peru’s State realized the greatest threat to the
solidity of their regime against the ‘yellow peril’: the birth of second-generation
Japanese children in Peru. Demonized from their arrival in Peru as characterless wives
prone to disease and hypersexual, the Japanese women now proceeded to embody an
even greater menace to Peru’s desired white hegemony. Through their reproduction
capacity they were the living embodiment of potential “racial suicide” in Peru.
In 1927 the Peruvian government put forth legislation requiring all Asian migrants
to be processed into the country through the “Sanitary Station of Callao.”165 This racist
provision marked the beginning of heightened surveillance policies directed at the
Japanese, preoccupied not just with their economic influence, but their physical threat to
Peru’s concept of “racial degeneration.” No other ethnicity besides Asians was forced
to adhere to this racial policy. It mirrored racial policies in existence for decades in the
United States that exhibited an obsession with the Asiatic body. The Asian body, and
particularly the female body, was denoted in the Americas as dirty, unhealthy, weak,
and hypersexual. Visual scrutiny of Chinese, and eventually the Japanese, was an
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ingrained approach in the United States through most of the first half of the 20th
century.166 As the United States moved from a system of visual regulation to extreme
photographic documentation and surveillance, they ensured that all arriving immigrants
were inserted into existing racial hierarchy, which protected European white ethnicity.167
Almost all immigrant groups besides those from the Asiatic sphere were screened
loosely upon arrival, and moved without surveillance on their documentation or identity
once they entered the United States.
In Peru, the sanitary station served as an “Ellis Island” type screening station for
the Japanese immigrants, but was just a starting point for monitoring their movement,
influence, and identity out of fear that their inferior race and bodies would degenerate
the existing populations whom deserved protection of their rights. This further exposed
race as a core tenet and rationale for the policies against the Japanese moving into the
1930’s, moving beyond how Asians contributed to economic misery toward how they
threatened racial destiny.
The early beginnings of Japanese settlement in Peru focused the narrative on
men who made up the overwhelming majority of the immigrants. Other facets of the
history further relegate gender to the periphery. Peruvian tradition greatly barred
women from visual spaces in the general politic of the nation, reinforced by the
dominance of male writers and perspectives in the media. Political positions were
reserved for men, and women did not gain the right to vote until after World War II.
From the Japanese side, the patriarchal structure was similarly rigid, although Japanese
women were more privy to public workspaces than Peruvian women. A huge space
166
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exists in this history for an analysis of Japanese women during the 1930’s and 1940’s,
particularly, the plight of family life as Japanese rights were continually restricted
building toward the war, and the stories of those left behind in Peru when the
incarceration period saw majority males deported and held in the United States.
Nonetheless, their role in this thesis, in analyzing the regime of anti-Japanese
rightlessness forged between the United States and Peru during the interwar period, is
crucial. Something that scholar Stephanie Carol Moore poignantly declared,
“Imperialism of the Womb,” in her work on race in Peru, Japanese women and offspring
became central figures for the Peruvian State affirming a stable racial destiny before
moving the Japanese to rightless space.

Japanese Women and Racial Destiny
Between 1923 and 1940 the proportion of women in Japanese communities grew
from 12% to 33% according to official Peruvian census.168 As stated, when the women
balanced the Japanese population of Peru, family communities replaced male labor
conglomerates as the place for home life for the Japanese. As a result women became
more visible in Peru, and heavily scrutinized by first, Peruvian eugenicists, and
subsequently the Peruvian State swayed by the scientific approach to race, rights, and
citizenship. Nancy Leys Stepan wrote about the history of eugenic policies in Latin
America, and asserted that women ascended to the forefront of rights politics in the
1930’s because of reproduction, always analyzed by women as their social role, and not
a factor in men’s social role under patriarchal Peruvian society.169 Already synonymous
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with promiscuity and sexuality from their identity as predominantly “Picture Brides”
devoid of romantic intimacy or character beyond their bodies, Peruvian eugenics viably
associated Japanese women with reproductive capacity. The concept of a return to
“Peruvianizing” the nation originated as a term of ethnic deterioration concerning the
economic depression, which the Peruvians judged the Japanese liable for. More
clearly, “Peruvianizing” was also the aim for rebuilding the foundation of the Peru’s next
generation with a majority of racially pure children, placing Japanese women and their
reproduction under the microscope of the Peruvian State.
Before analyzing the imperialism of the womb, it remains important to
comprehend how Peru contradictorily associated women with weakness and sexual
lust. Peruvian women were encouraged to embrace any white race immigrants, but the
Japanese women and ‘yellow race’ in general was tied to weakness and considered
repulsive.170 Peru feared Japanese men intermingling with Peruvian women and sought
to regulate sexual access to them. However, they also symbolized the Japanese
women as objects to be desired, exotic and eroticized, but with a darkness and
weakness more fitting for Japanese men who similarly embodied such traits.171 Two
popular songs in Peru, “El Tonkin” and “La Japonesa” term the Japanese women as
objects of “frenzied” sexual desire, but still dark, with “ugly heart.” These characteristics
were widely endorsed in Peru, and defined Japanese female identity from their earliest
arrival. Therefore, as will be evidenced, weakness and eroticization of Japanese
women became key justifications of the peril Japanese women reproduction presented
to Peru’s desired racial dream. Already ingrained in the cultural understanding of the
170
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Japanese, the eugenics movement swiftly proliferated such discourses to further the
regime of rightlessness aimed at the ‘yellow peril,’ demonstrating the need for legal
action to suppress mass reproduction of Peruvian Japanese

Peruvian Eugenics
Paz Soldan, a Peruvian man commonly figured as the father of the eugenics
movement in Peru, as early as 1919 launched continuous attacks on the Japanese
immigrants. Never one to mince words, Soldan was a mainstay in Peruvian
newspapers. In an article from El Comercio in 1919, Soldan pleaded with Peruvians to,
“Avoid these human dregs, that this scum comes as immigrants and an extraordinary
step will have been taken in defending the national race.”172 In the same newspaper he
termed the Japanese “human waste.”173 From the viewpoint of Soldan and other
eugenicists, such “human waste” was being reproduced at catastrophic rates. From
1932 to 1936 Japanese births rose from 3.91% of all Lima births to 4.34%, far from
astronomically figures, but nonetheless worthy of reaction by the eugenics leaders and
the political administration.174 Soldan further asserted the following year that the birth
rate of the Japanese caused a 4% increase in the city of Lima alone.175 Remembering
the discourse on Japanese women that they were promiscuous bodies of sexual lust,
this rhetoric was translated into the perception that Japanese women were more fertile
than Peruvian women. Previously associated with exotic sexuality, they now were
synonymous with abnormal reproductive capacity. Combining this designation with the
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conceptualization of Japanese women and the Japanese race as weak, “human waste,”
and barbaric, led eugenicists to easily latch on to such discourse and raise awareness
to the threat posed to racial destiny.
In a vehement article on the Japanese in Peru, Soldan spearheaded the
movement. He bemoaned, “Under such conditions a mutation can be predicted in the
not so distant future for the race which populates Lima,” and that the number of unfit
children “gushed from the womb of the imported race.”176 Newspapers quickly replicated
his belief. The paper El Oriente noted that Japanese mothers could multiply in a way
that “mothers of that nationality know how to,” which could create Japanese colonies in
Peru.177 Reaction to such assertions did not escape Peruvian administration and the
legal policy changes enacted during the 1930’s advancing Japanese rightlessness.
Where decades prior Peru begged for an infusion of Japanese women into Peru to help
stabilize alleged Japanese savagery, now official policy reversed. The infamous 1936
Immigration Act to abolish Japanese immigration also took aim to curtail the influence of
Japanese women. While previously Peru encouraged Japanese men “calling” for their
wives legally and often exempted them from quota numbers, now any Japanese women
married to men in Peru were included in the quota limits placed on Japanese
immigration. What Stephanie Carol Moore termed “Imperialism of the Womb” became
arguably the greatest fear of the Peruvian public and government. While Japanese men
were the target of economic and militaristic rhetoric restricting their mobility and rights,
Japanese women posed a direct threat to racial destiny via their body. Their bodies
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sourced the threat of expanded Japanese militarism in Peru and across the South
American continent.
Eugenics attack on the Japanese occurred forcefully in Peru during the 1920’s
and 1930’s, and particularly found home in the anti-Japanese Peruvian media willing to
attack the Japanese from any angle. Like the legislative and economic restrictive laws
put in place, the eugenics movement in Peru did not originate or permeate Peruvian
consciousness in a vacuum. The United States eugenics movement was far-reaching
and the symbolic head of the Pan-American scientific movement to define race, rights
and citizenship. Furthermore, the United States had a long history of anxiety over the
Asiatic body, from the earliest Chinese immigrants to the Japanese exclusion era. Like
any economic or legal measure taken in Peru, the eugenics movement, and particularly
the designation of Japanese women and children as a racial threat, aligned significantly
with the American model of eugenics and racial ideology.

Eugenics in America during Interwar Period
A fear of “race suicide” encapsulated Americans during the interwar period,
which coincided with the codification of eugenics in law. Fear of birthrates dropping in
the white and upper middle classes, combined with the sexualized stereotype that
immigrant groups were hypersexed with heightened reproductive tendencies, brought
fear of racial, and therefore moral, decay in America. As one eugenicist angrily
lamented, the unfit were “multiplying like rabbits.”178 Like in Peru, the central figure of
eugenics in America became the mother and the child. However, in America, the
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eugenics movement also focused on “positive eugenics,” meaning the racial vision of
the model American mother, and therefore, offspring. Promoting procreation became
essential agenda because of multiple factors, and not all of them racial degeneracy.
The emphasis on sexual depravity as a justification for monitoring and regulating
motherhood and reproduction served as the primary link between genetics and the
rightlessness imposed upon Japanese, both in the United States and in Peru. As
eugenics took on the attributes of a fad during the interwar period, anti-miscegenation
hysteria also gripped the public body. Eugenicists not only asserted that pure Japanese
relations drastically increased immoral offspring (Japanese ethnic children), but also
that the offspring of mixed-race marriages were more susceptible to diseases and less
moral, a biological sin. The sexual aggressiveness stereotype attributed to the
Japanese in Peru was also major factor in the fear of ‘racial suicide’ in America.
The sexual aggressiveness stereotype posed two significant patterns that
significantly influenced exclusionist policies leading up to eventual incarceration. First,
the depiction of the Japanese man as a hypersexed threat to the White woman was a
common thread in anti-Japanese discrimination. Roger Daniels cited a headline in a
California newspaper, “Japanese a Menace to American Women.”179 Scholar Dennis
Ogawa agreed with this common theme in anti-Japanese ethnic stereotyping,
explaining, “Driven by a beastly sexual urge, the Jap would endanger the white female
and the purity of the Anglo American stock.”180 The hypersexed Japanese male was
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supplemented by the representation of the Japanese woman possessing extraordinary
reproductive capacity. Ogawa cited an influential exclusionist business magnate,
Valentine McClatchy, who declared, “The biological fecundity of the Japanese is so
great that in a limited time, I think 64 years, the entire state will be Japanese.”181 When
the incarceration period began, a common worry was that the camps would become
“breeding farms,” and that the Japanese “breed like rabbits.”182 These sentiments were
widespread in the United States, a direct reaction to the powerful eugenics movement,
and echoed declarations made in Peru about Japanese sexuality and reproduction.
Concepts of racial purity, especially concerning offspring and future generations,
greatly dictated major historical events levied against the Japanese during the period,
such as the Immigration Act of 1924 and the programs to restrict reproduction and
Japanese-born offspring rights in Peru during the 1930’s. Other scholars do agree with
this assessment. James Tyner wrote, “…Eugenically informed geopolitical discourseand not solely a racist ideology- greatly informed the decision to incarcerate 120,000
persons of Japanese ancestry when the opportunity presented itself.”183 He also later
remarked, “The liberties and human rights of these people were violated because,
according to eugenical-geopolitical doctrine, sacrifices were necessary for the
preservation of race and nation.” Scholar Allison Renteln also supported this notion.
She claimed, “I argue that a deeply rooted fear of sexual congress between the
races…motivated some of the actions which led to the internment of 120,000 Japanese
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Americans.”184 Assessing the psychological concept of projection, where anxieties of
one group are displaced onto another, Renteln affirmed sexuality as a key underlying
fear and component of the incarceration history.

Tying Eugenic Ideology to Fear of Reproduction and Militarism
The fear of a new generation of Japanese children intimately connected to the
growing fear of militarism and espionage. At emergency Pan-American special
committee meetings between 1936 and 1942 related specifically to security, the
committees acknowledged that Japanese immigrant children in Peru and other Latin
nations were potential agents of the Japanese government.185 In fact, the Emergency
Advisory Committee for the American Republics commended Peru on their late 1930’s
legislation restricting the citizenship rights of Japanese born in Peru. The 1940 decree
disallowing Peruvian citizenship if young Japanese went to study in Japan during their
youth was pronounced by the Pan American committee as legislation which prevented
what, “probably could have become the most serious abuse of American
nationality…”186 The Peruvian State determined that Peruvian-born Japanese were of
“Japanese soul” and not “Peruvian soul” because their culture strongly encouraged
education in Japan. Foreign Minister of Peru Alberto Ulloa y Sotomayor exclaimed,
“They will return under the protection of their nationality of origin…in the control of the
Japanese State; or acting in response to mysterious movements or orders…to carry out

184

Renteln, 618.
Moore, 270.
186 “Memorandum Prepared by the Chief of the Section of Congresses and International
Organizations of the Ministry of Foreign Relation and Culture of Peru for the Emergency
Advisory Committee,” as quoted in “Legislación,” 1, 537.
185

87

a mysterious objective.”187 The leader in Peruvian eugenics, Paz Soldán, also protested
the rights of Peruvian-born Japanese and their education travels to Japan, and
simultaneously derided the children for possessing little health or strength.188
Connecting Japanese militarism to eugenics and the ills of reproducing Peruvian-born
Japanese stabilized anti-Japanese sentiment and protected legislative actions such as
the decrees to limit their birthright citizenship. Benefiting off of the robust anxiety of
Japanese militarism while linking it to the Peruvian-born Japanese children created a
significant tool to wield for the Peruvian State as they moved to suppress, and
eventually remove, Japanese influence in Peru.
At the VII Pan American Children’s Conference held in Mexico in 1935, Soldan
took a lead role in associating fear of Japanese empire with Japanese women and
children in Peru. After generally calling for curtailing Japanese immigration and
influence to defend the proper racial characteristics of the New World, he further
chastised Japanese women’s prolific production of children as an attempt to create an
“ethnic empire” to advice political and imperial interests of Japan.189 Japanese
exclusionist and campaign leader V.S McClatchey supported this focus on women and
expanding militarism, recalling that all Japanese brides possess loyal duty to the
Emperor to have as many children as possible for imperial purposes.190

187

Ulloa y Sotomayor, Posición Internacional Del Perú, (Lima, Perú: Gondo Editorial del
Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, [1941], 1997), 342.
188 Moore, 279,
189 Paz Soldán, “La Penetración Japonesa En El Perú” La Prensa.
190 V.S. McClatchy, “Japanese Immigration and Colonization: Brief Prepared for
Consideration by the State Department, “ 1921. In V.S. McClatchey, ed, Four AntiJapanese Pamphlets (New York: Arno Press, 1978), 65.
88

The quick reaction of Japanese parents to protect their Nisei offspring rights
concretely demonstrated the problem Japanese reproduction posed for the Peruvian
State and public fearful of racial degeneration. Japanese parents who did not register
their children within a regulatory period after their birth could only submit a petition to
local judicial authorities to have the births registered via court order.191 After the 1936
decree was enacted Japanese parents hastily issued thousands of petitions within the
subsequent year. When mass notices of the judicial announcements and certificates
granted appeared in the newspaper La Prensa, the Peruvian populace started violent
riots and protests in Lima.192 The aftermath of the 1936 decree led to the Peruvian
public becoming more visible actors in the anti-Japanese regime, no longer relying on
the State and media to provide their voice, but more frequently organizing protests and
demonstrations in public. Attempting to quell this hostility, the Peruvian administration
enacted another decree in 1937 which annulled even birth certificates issued via court
order petition after the 1936 immigration decree, and suspended the right to register any
Japanese born before the 1936 decree.193 This meant nearly 2,500 Nisei Japanese
were stripped of their citizenship rights. As Stepahnie Carol Moore asserted, the
ramifications of their inability to prove citizenship became even more devastating when
the deportation era began.194 Another decree in 1940, titled “Peruvian-born Children of
Foreigners,” established that studying in Japan warranted a loss of citizenship, a
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response to the Inter-American Emergency Advisory Committee’s recommendation that
Japanese children could be potential agents.195
This connection between militarism anxiety, Japanese reproduction, and Nisei
rights gained more importance when considering that the period for Japanese in Peru
between 1939-1945 was defined by alleged military espionage and fifth column activity.
Under the Alien Enemies Act of 1798, the United States proceeded to use the suspicion
of Japanese subversive activity under any vague accusations to deport and incarcerate
them out of Peru and into United States war camps. They did so indirectly, supposedly
not assisting Peru in apprehending their alien nationals, and only asserting control over
them once they reached U.S soil.196 However, the Alien Enemies Act also loosely
allowed transnational use so long as the alien threat was directed at the United States,
something feasible to establish after the Pearl Harbor attack. Any uncorroborated
evidence could be used against the Japanese, and as will be seen during in the
analysis of this period, most of the evidence was deemed valid based off of falsities and
unsubstantiated rumors.
In analyzing the period of Japanese deportation and incarceration from Peru, it
remains crucial to remember how intertwined militarism, racial destiny, and Japanese
reproduction and sexuality was. The slightest piece of evidence or association could be
used to deport a Japanese from Peru, regardless of citizenship status. For an
underlying motivation to remove them from Peruvian society, one can turn focus away
from the accusations levied against them, and understand that removing them was
necessary for racial destiny. With this perception, we can understand that a great
195
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percentage of the deportations from Peru were not a part of wartime hysteria concerned
with subversion, but a direct response to growing Japanese influence interfering with
desired racial hegemony.

Concluding Chapter 2
As Japanese poured into Peru and other areas of Latin America at the start of
the century, it became explicitly essential to stabilize the existing racial hierarchy
dominated by European-Latins, and to place the Japanese in a position to pose little
threat. The discrimination they faced upon arrival in Peru compounded their initial goal
to find prosperity in Peru after years and decades of economic and violent hardship in
Japan. Problematic for the Peruvian State and people, the Japanese overcame many
societal obstacles during the period from 1899-1923, and because of their incredible will
to succeed found economic success and forged intimate Japanese communities
through their own mobility. Coinciding with the end of World War I, the rise of the
nation-state, and the concept of border protection, Peru was dismayed over increasing
Japanese influence, beginning a new phase where restricting rights and exclusion were
necessary to protect Peru’s desired racial hegemony.
Rather than attack Japanese rights alone, Peru found a motivated partner in the
United States, a nation Peru saw as a model for economic and racial success. The
United States, increasingly concerned with their neighbors to the South, sought to
ingrain their racial and security ideologies into the Peruvian fabric. The Japanese,
despised in both countries as parasites living off of the white racial dream, became the
direct target of legislation to restrict their rights and mobility, which they had used to
facilitate economic success and community stability. The United States, in response to
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both populist sentiment and the racial prejudice of the State, first attempted to weaken
Japanese economic prosperity, before using legislative action to close borders to
Japanese migrants and weaken the growth of the Japanese community. In the next
decade, Peru modeled the United States immigration act and delivered its own set of
restrictive legislation to limit Japanese rights and close immigration and naturalization
proceedings. Discussions to foment this hemispheric plan to dispossess the Japanese
of human rights transpired between State communications, and also Pan-American
conferences aimed to unite anti-Japanese ideology. Placing the Japanese in such a
position of vulnerability pertaining to their human rights existed and flourished because
of this transnational effort.
Understanding the racial component of the incarcerations can only be
understood through realizing how the dimensions were intimately linked to Japanese
sexuality and reproduction, and Japanese women and children. The combination of
eugenic principles and racism merit some responsibility for the incarceration period in
which the Japanese from Peruvian society were removed and placed into rightless
space. Our understanding of the incarceration must be removed from its direct
historical context, in this case wartime, and expanded to the discourses and action from
earlier. To deprive the Japanese from Peru of their rights and move them to rightless
space occurred as part of a eugenically informed process to preserve white racial
destiny and the idealized vision of Peru as a nation. Depriving them of their rights was
not just a method to protect the present security of the nation, but great evidence exists
which demonstrated how it was also a hopeful method for race improvement. Perhaps
nothing evidenced this more than the fact that Peru, after wartime ended and the
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security threat from Japanese militarism eradicated, pleaded with the United States to
not allow any of the Japanese-Peruvians to return to Peru. Fewer than 100 of the
18,000 deported were allowed back to Peru, validating the argument that Peru desired
to preserve its racial destiny by removing as many Japanese as possible through the
Pan-American regime of anti-Japanese alliance.
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Chapter III: Executing Pan-American Regime of
Rightlessness
Introduction to Chapter 3
After decades of discourse and policy attacking the Japanese influence and
status in Peru to make them undesirable subjects, the Pan-American Regime of
Rightlessness used the advent of war during the 1940’s to facilitate removal of
Japanese from Peru. Although the laws and policies enacted in Peru during the
previous decades made their removal more feasible, the status of any such Japanese at
the time of detainment hardly affected their fate. Citizens and non-citizens, as well as
Nisei (second-generation) born Peruvians, were all subject to the detainment and
deportation program if sufficient suspicion was provided to project them as a threat to
hemispheric security. This section analyzes the U.S-Peruvian correspondence between
the State Departments and other foreign administrative bodies concerning Japanese
deportation and incarceration moving into wartime, the culminating episode of the
Japanese path in Peru from undesirables to rightless subject.

Pre-Pearl Harbor U.S-Peru Discussions over Wartime and Japanese
The United States Department of State’s concern over the Japanese influential
presence in Peru began years before the attack on Pearl Harbor, and even before the
series of legislative restrictions in Peru in the mid-1930’s. U.S ambassador Henry
Norweb sent warning to the United States in 1932 that possibly 15,000 Japanese
soldiers were available in Peru and might consider an attack on the Panama Canal.197
The susceptibility of the Panama became a crucial early focal point for American
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concern over Japanese presence. Secretary of State Sumner Wells wrote in his
memoir that as early as the mid 1930’s President Roosevelt was concerned with the
territorial proximity of Japanese in Peru to the Panama Canal, and this motivated the
forming of the Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Peace in 1936 in
Buenos Aires.198 The preoccupation with the security of the Panama Canal heightened
during World War I, and also created a security precedent for detaining enemy alien
threats beyond U.S borders (discussed later). The same year of the 1936 InterAmerican Conference the Roosevelt administration authorized investigations into
threatening organizations in Latin America, leading to FBI involvement in the Japanese
situation in Peru.

FBI in Peru
Additional presidential directives and congressional acts reinforced FBI authority
to conduct an infiltrative investigation into potential Japanese sabotage in Peru. A
specific contingent, called the Special Intelligence Service in Latin America, was tasked
with a unique agenda to observe Japanese nationals in Peru, collecting data through
surveillance on movement and perceived irrational behaviors.199 John Emmerson, U.S
diplomat in Peru at the time, also corroborated that the Collateral U.S Army and Navy
intelligence programs worked to gather intelligence on the Japanese in Peru.200 The
major problem with the FBI intelligence workings in Peru was their inclination for
sources networked through U.S affiliated organizations and figures whom already
198
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supported anti-Japanese sentiments. With Peruvian government anti-Japanese actions
in the context of this FBI period, such as the annulment of dual citizenship, reflective of
American actions, predetermined discourses on Japanese dominated the intelligence
gathering.
J. Edgar Hoover delighted in absorbing recommendations from the non-ruling
opposition American Popular Revolutionary Alliance party and their charismatic leader
Víctor Raúl Haya de la Torre, a party whose platform centered on xenophobia, racism
and anti-indigenous emotionality with little factual evidence. In a memo to Assistant
Secretary of State for Latin American Affairs Adolf A. Berle Jr ,Hoover relished Haya de
la Torre’s proclamation that the Japanese community was overwhelmingly male with all
of its members already serving in the Japanese army.201 Census numbers and other
figures greatly contradicted both assertions, but Hoover was enamored with Haya de la
Torre’s denouncing of the Axis alliance while the rest of Peru remained rather cautiously
impartial. The same Hoover memos cited how Peruvian rumors of Japanese control
over important Amazon basin points and suspicious fifth columnist activity concerning
Peruvian Indians were abundant, unsubstantiated rumors likely proliferated by the
APRA who delighted in anti-indigenous propaganda.202
Scholars of the incarceration program acknowledge language as a difficult
obstacle for FBI intelligence accuracy, causing misinterpretations of translated
documents intercepted.203 While the Special Intelligence Service obtained many
Japanese documents, the lack of any representative in the U.S embassy with strong
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Japanese skills forced the FBI to rely on face value intelligence gathered orally from
agencies, informants, and anti-Japanese politicians. Those brought in for questioning
possessed no ability to protest their detainment or accurately rationalize the suspicions
levied against them. Even before the incarceration period, this method of interrogation
and detainment became the theme for confronting Japanese threats. For example,
informants notified the FBI that the alleged fifth column activity within the Amazon basin
was supported by a possible alliance between the Peruvian Indians present there and
the Japanese.204 This unsupported allegation was highly unlikely due to general
animosity between the Peruvian Indians and the Japanese, and the allegation was
understood at face value without any further investigation or appearance of credible
evidence. Any consideration perceived as ‘dangerous’ permitted action, based solely
on the perpetuation of recommendations sourced from firm anti-Japanese informants.205

Panama Precedent
Despite popular belief, Roosevelt’s Executive Order did not serve as the only
precedent for Japanese incarceration, as a World War I plan outlined and directed in
Panama illustrated the legal course necessary for transnational incarceration of alien
enemies. American fear over the vulnerability of the Panama Canal and its importance
to American interests was evident in the Pan American conferences. At the First
Meeting of Consultation of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the American Republics in
1939, a resolution was recommended that the governments of the Latin republics “take
the necessary measures to eradicate from the Americas the spread of doctrines that
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tend to place in jeopardy inter-American ideal.”206 The most prominent space for this
fear was the Panama Canal, so after the Nazi invasion of Poland, Pan-America hastily
forged the Declaration of Panama, which proclaimed a neutrality zone around the Canal
area.207 Anxiety over potential Axis sabotage of the Panama Canal area guided much
of Pan-American response to Axis efforts in Latin America. A precedent with the Canal
also existed and was linked to the actual legal loophole allowing the detainment of
potential sabotage threats transnationally from the last World War. The Panamanian
government was tasked with protecting the Panama Canal during World War I, and
swiftly apprehended German enemy aliens in close proximity and interned them on
Taboga Island before transporting them to the United States.
This was the first 20th century transnational use in the American Republics by the
United States of the authority granted by the Alien Enemy Act of 1798, permitting the
removal of any “native, citizens, denizens, or subjects” of a foreign nation which
perpetuates, attempts, or threatens any incursion against the United States.208 U.S
courts validated the internments connected to Panama from the World War I era as
legal. U.S courts also consistently ruled that action taken under the Alien Enemy Act
was unreviewable.209 The Panama precedent outlined the vast authority over
designating and detaining alien enemies granted to the sitting U.S president during
wartime. Court decisions from the Woodrow Wilson era consistently upheld presidential
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authority over aliens.210A case which arose from World War I internment, Minotto v
Bradley, rejected procedural rights for aliens, leaving determination over alien
internment to the president.211 The Japanese from Peru unfortunately fell victim to a
consistent theme in U.S foreign policy. The U.S remains hesistant to protect individual
rights abroad because of the fear over impeding the powers of sovereignty deemed so
integral to U.S foreign affairs.212
When Panama and the United States began discussing potential plans for
handling Panamanian Axis enemy aliens during the late 1930’s, records show U.S
officials and Panama agreed to incarcerate “as was done in the last war.”213 Even
earlier, in April of 1941, seven months before Pearl Harbor, President Roosevelt wrote
to his Secretary of State Cordell Hull proffering the establishment of a detention camp
on Galapagos Island for the Latin American countries to use for Axis sympathizers.214
The pre-Pearl Harbor discussions between U.S administration and intelligence
agencies with Peruvian and other Latin governments further indicate the unified,
cohesive Pan-American effort against undesirable aliens before war conflict. Potential
threat of militaristic action against the United States or integral zones such as the
Panama Canal permeated the consciousness of the Pan-American security system.
This system, responding to unsubstantiated allegations of fifth-columnist activity,
latched onto the greatest anxiety of all these nations during wartime, a fear of Japanese
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controlled American territory. This concern of Japanese espionage developed from the
phobia of a multiplying Japanese race, a fear with roots in the eugenic concepts of
racial destiny and concern over high rates of Japanese reproduction in Pan-American
lands. The process to rid Peru of their Japanese presence clearly was fomented prior
to Pearl Harbor and the official beginning of the Latin wartime period.

Pan-America Agenda on Japanese Foreign Subversive Activity
The Second Meeting of Consultation of Foreign Ministers of the American
Republicans was held in 1940 in Havana and more concretely realized the grave threat
that menacing foreign subversive actions by Japanese nationals posed to American
stability. Afraid of potential Western Europe’s imminent collapse, public and State tone
against Japanese presence in Latin America transformed into uncontrollable paranoia,
and Pan-American directives consequently were more specific. The foreign ministers
urged their Latin governments to: prevent political activity by foreign diplomatic or
consular agents, use precautionary measures taken in granting passports, and extend
effective police supervision of the activities of foreign extracontinental groups.215 They
encouraged the Latin republics to adopt measures to prevent and suppress any
activities directed, assisted, or abetted by foreign governments, groups, or
individuals.216 Later in 1940, Peru and other Latin nations agreed in exchange for U.S
defense assistance they would maintain efficient surveillance of aliens and subversive
groups and also work to eliminate the proliferation of anti-United States propaganda
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from such groups.217 Although Peru and other nations for decades conducted
surveillance of the Japanese via their own national process measures under
transnational anti-Japanese ideology, now a new direction from Pan-America was
formed and it too led to practical action. Transnational anti-Japanese ideology now
transitioned to anti-Japanese practical exclusion and detainment actions.

Pearl Harbor Effect on Peru
The attack on Pearl Harbor spurred drastic action on the Japanese in Peru as
early as the following day. Japanese newspapers, businesses, and schools closed, and
Peru quickly moved to pass legislation cancelling all land leases to the Japanese.218
Another decree forbade the gathering of more than three Japanese persons in public
spaces without special permission, revoked possession of arms licenses, and
confiscated 355 telephones from Japanese community buildings.219 Peru’s eagerness to
address the Japanese problem was on full display, with a Lima Military attaché sent to
the U.S War Department pondering the distribution of American military presence into
Peru in the interest of security.220 Peru broke relations with Japan in late January,
affirming their solidarity with U.S war interests, ending Japanese-Peruvian relations
already deteriorating for decades.
President of Peru Manuel Prado y Ugarteche’s administration saw the Pearl
Harbor attack as a perfect opportunity to rid itself of the Japanese population. In early
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1942 initial discussions between the U.S and Peru over deportation processes
concerned mostly disposition of Axis diplomatic and official personnel. In reality, when
Peru accepted the American proposal for Axis officials to be repatriated via the United
States, Peru was granted an opening for repatriating nonofficial Axis suspects as well,
as the United States would conduct the dirty work and alleviate Peru’s concern over
detaining, incarcerating, and deporting within their own territory.

The Emergency Advisory Committee for Political Defense
The third foreign minister’s conference took place after the attack on Pearl
Harbor in Rio in early 1942. Axis alien enemies and subversive action took were the
conference’s biggest issue and the American delegation led the fight to incorporate a
more detailed resolution on dealing with the Japanese in Latin territory. The prevention
of subversive activities was based in four recognized categories of anti-Japanese
defense: The control of dangerous aliens, prevention of abuse of citizenship, control of
international travel, and prevention of acts of espionage, sabotage, and subversive
propaganda.221 The Final Act of this January 1942 conference formed a seven-country
body in charge of the 21 programs of action based off the four categories.
It remained difficult for the U.S to attain hemispheric unified enforcement of all
the programs, forced to rely on the individual national governments to adopt and
implement the proposals at their discretion, fluctuating widely. By all accounts, Peru
was an enthusiastic participant with some difficulty directly identifying with all the
proposals, but certainly aligned on the subject of detainment. Resolution 20 of the
Committee’s proposals, titled “Detention and Expulsion of Dangerous Nationals,”
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claimed only two procedures existed for safeguarding the Japanese threat:
incarcerating dangerous Axis nationals for the duration of the war, or repatriation of
them to their country of origin.222 Crucially, while the resolution specified the Latin
Republics to incarcerate within their boundary, it did state that if they are unable to
adopt such a detention program, the resolution permitted a complementary program of
expulsion for the duration of the war.223 Impermissibly, by the point of the ratification of
the Resolution 20 in June 1943 the United States and Peru already operated their own
detainment, deportation, and incarceration program. So what relevance does the
EACPD possess pertaining to the legality of the process? It provided critical diplomatic
screening and veiled legal shielding for the actions taken.224 Within the context of
wartime, the incarceration and deportations imposed faced little immediate legal
backlash, feeding off heightened Japanese paranoia within the U.S and Peruvian State
departments. However, the air of legitimacy it created provided justification against
potential legal interruptions during the latter half of the war and at its conclusion.

Deportation Setup-State Department, U.S Embassy in Peru, and the
Peruvian Foreign Ministry
The Pearl Harbor attack immediately obliged the United States and Peru to add
Japanese nationals to a Peruvian blacklist already containing German and Italian
nationals from earlier in 1941. By early 1941, in accordance with Resolution 20
permitting U.S relief assistance to take charge in the incarceration process, the
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assistant Secretary of State Breckinridge Long corresponded with Henry Norweb, U.S
ambassador in Peru. Long assured Norweb, concerned with Peru’s inability to financial
fund such action, that the U.S would be glad to assume the expenses of bringing Axis
officials to the U.S on a path to repatriation.225 Key here was the initial objective to
remove and repatriate officials, justified under the pretense of exchange for American or
Latin officials in Japan. Instead, nonofficials were soon included. Jefferson Hull, first
secretary of the U.S embassy in Lima, met with the chief minster in the Ministry of
Peruvian Foreign Affairs, and in this meeting authorized a compilation of lists of
Japanese, at this point still only officials, who allegedly desired to leave Peru.226 At this
meeting a crucial turning point in the incarceration history took place. Patterson warned
that many of the Axis officials desired to take considerable number of persons along
with them not on the officials list, several who the embassy had surveillance evidence of
as active agents in Axis subversion.227 Just a few weeks after the meeting, Secretary of
State Cordell Hull wrote to Norweb that the State Department finalized plans to also
handle nonofficial Axis personnel. He stated, “Any such non-officials brought to this
country will be maintained here in protective custody at the expense of this government
pending negotiations looking to an ultimate general exchange with the Axis
powers....”228 Norweb responded expressing the Lima foreign office’s concern over
whether the such nonofficial deportations could also include women and children, but
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the United States wrote on the telegram margins, “…endeavor to ignore this paragraph
in replying.”229 While the U.S showed hesitancy fully committing to nonofficial Japanese
removal, Peru clearly anticipated the potential to deport as many Japanese as possible,
regardless of gender or official status.

Henry Norweb
The central link between the United States and Peruvian governments, Norweb
was the key player for the entire Peruvian deportation program. He viewed the situation
as a “win-win,” where Peru could aid U.S war efforts and endeavor itself to the U.S,
while also simultaneously ridding Peru of the disliked Japanese who long proved a thorn
in Peru’s racial destiny.230 In his rigorous pursuit of creating Japanese official and
nonofficial lists, Norweb showed disregard for factual analysis of the Japanese subjects
regarding their background or potential for fifth column activity.231 His strict confidential
dispatches back to the U.S highlight his motivations and disregard. In April of 1942 he
wrote to the Military Intelligence Division and the FBI that nonofficial personnel would be
on the same ships as many of the diplomatic officers deported, and that the Peruvian
government wanted them gone, with no care about their final destination.232 He
prophesized that many of them would eventually take up arms in the U.S if not placed
immediately into concentration camps.233 Regardless if an immigrant or born in Peru,
the Japanese official legal status in Peru was compounded by the fact that they were
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considered transient under Peruvian official decrees during the early 1940’s. Under
international law, their transient status and the wartime statutes on public order and
security allowed the Peruvian government to act with total impunity, easily authorizing
Japanese expulsion.
However, even Norweb admitted that the danger that the Japanese nonofficial
posed to the country was “potential rather than an active one.”234 Therefore, to
rationalize his recommended strategy for listing the Japanese, Norweb turned to the
WRA paradigm in effect in the U.S. He saw how the WRA formula advised removing
leaders of prominent Japanese communities in the absence of tangible evidence of
subversion. To break any potential factions forming, Norweb explained that removing
journalists, teachers, officers in clubs and organizations, and business leaders would
render the entire Japanese population in Peru without leadership or direction.235 He was
proud to project the American system of detainment in operation at the time unto the
Peruvian project, considering it his most important problem to confront and
“Americanize.” The Pan-American ideology of security proliferated for decades was
exemplified in the core actions and beliefs of Norweb during the early 1942 assembling
of a deportation plan in Peru, as he forged the bridge between WRA policy and the
Peruvian program commencing.

What Evidence Instigated Peruvian Fear?
In general, Peruvian paranoia over the Japanese potential for subversive action
stemmed from the discourses discussed in Chapter 2. Fear over their reproduction
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capacity, their degeneration and potential for “racial suicide,” along with their
inclusiveness nature created profound anxieties in the Peruvian government and public.
On this basis alone the deportation program might have formed, but some Japanese
wartime rhetoric directed at Peru also influenced the escalation of Japanese removal. A
letter intercepted by the FBI in California from a deported Axis National disclosed a
military colonel threatening action against Peru if they broke relations after Pearl
Harbor.236 However, both Emmerson and Norweb discounted the seriousness of the
letter as a hollow, symbolic attempt to prevent deteriorating relations. The U.S reacted
more seriously to a meeting between a former Peruvian minister in Tokyo with Japan’s
foreign office, where the officials reminded the Peruvian officer of the 40,000 Japanese
in Peru, how this placed Peru “face to face with Japan” unique from any other Latin
country.237 While the FBI opinioned that this was a legitimate threat, Emmerson,
perhaps the most connected American official to the Japanese situation in Peru, greatly
questioned the potential for any Japanese attack on Peru, or any Japanese mass
uprising.238 In rational terms, no military threat from Japan ever possessed enough
concrete direction or momentum to coarse into legitimate military defense response.
Nonetheless, as Executive Order 9066 exemplified, U.S officials responded to
any threat with concern and belief in the negative. Rational interpretation of threats and
potential action was usurped by overwhelming fear, xenophobia, racism and the
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perception of possessing moral justification.239 In many ways, Japan may have been
simply manipulating U.S and Peru. Scholar Thomas Connell theorized that Japan
exploited U.S officials in a psychological game to try to keep Peru neutral.240 Japan
was clinging to hopes that Peru, one of the few Latin nations to not declare war
officially, would not completely break relations, and would remain within the Japanese
sphere of influence. The inability of U.S intelligence to accurately and rationally
interpret their veiled threats permitted the expunging of thousands of innocent Japanese
men, women and children from Peru.

Blacklist
Following Norweb’s recommendations, approximately 160 businesses were
included on the Proclaimed List of Certain blocked Nationals in the months after Pearl
Harbor.241 This not only hurt the Japanese business sectors within the communities, but
also the Peruvian society in Lima as a whole, as major services such as bus companies
and cotton trade nearly collapsed. The attack on Japanese business figures was an
attempt to decapitate the top of the Japanese hierarchy within their communities.
Seiichi Higashide, a blacklisted Japanese business owner and community leader,
recounted how the psychological effect of being blacklisted was devastating. He wrote,
“In a single night, we had become ‘enemy aliens.’”242 He lamented how the fear in
communities dramatically grew with every month as more Peruvian Japanese
“disappeared,” as the Japanese slowly began to understand their fate was deportation.
As previously stated, protecting business investments was impossible as the Peruvian
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State already enacted legislation to prevent Japanese from transferring rights and
property to their Nisei offspring, meaning listing on the Blacklist led to immediate
poverty and economic struggle. Criteria for inclusion on the blacklist were full of
corruption, miscalculation, and speculation. In his research Harvey Gardiner found that
many of the addresses of those named were completely wrong, and sometimes not
even listed, and that the Peruvian Japanese names were jumbled.243 One man, Pedro
Tomio Nabeta was listed under three versions of his name. Japanese with Spanish
names, instead of being viewed as possessing Peruvian roots and acculturation, were
viewed as extra suspicious use of aliases.
By summer of 1942 Peru mandated programs of expropriation of all Japanese
owned businesses, leaving the Japanese communities in complete economic despair.
By early 1943 nearly 2,000 Japanese were unemployed.244 The U.S latched onto their
despair by spreading the false assertion that the Japanese in Peru desired deportation
and incarceration in the U.S as opposed to their horrible situation in Peru. This
paradoxical theme was grasped by the U.S State Department to stabilize moral
justification of their actions, choosing to overlook their culpability for the Japanese
deterioration in Peru. A story from Norweb evidenced the contradictions the U.S
exhibited. Norweb discussed a suspicious sawmill owned by Japanese man Tingo
Maria that was a possible site of fifth columnist activity. However, when the State
Department thought to act on the sawmill, Norweb responded that an American
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economic “takeover” of the site was in progress and that in doing so the site would no
longer offer suspicion and the owners would likely be deported.245
Peru again sought U.S approval of women and children and other nonofficial
personnel after the first denial by Long immediately after Pearl Harbor, seeing
Resolution 20 and the wartime climate as an exceptional opportunity to rid the country
of many Japanese. After discussions between Cordell Hull and the U.S attorney’s office
concluded in late Spring of 1942 that, based off the successful Panamanian
deportations during World War I, the deportation of Peruvian Japanese of any citizen or
non-citizen status was legal, the U.S relented to nonofficial inclusions.246 The State
Department began proceedings, but only after expressing reservations about the
adequate number of facilities available in 1942. Consequently, the State Department
reminded Peru that the U.S government found it necessary as a temporary measure to
separate families, something to which Peru offered no response or objection.247 While
Peruvian-U.S relations maintained fluidity throughout the incarceration process, it was
not without discord. Emmerson and Norweb, the chief players in charge of the groundlevel detaining, blacklisting, and deportation process in Peru, grew weary of differing
agendas between meeting blacklist criteria.

From Japanese Leaders to “Japs a Jap” Policy
In his memoirs, Emmerson wrote, “…despite efforts to deport dangerous
Japanese aliens, passengers who embarked were not the ones carefully identified by
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United States.248 Although Emmerson pointed the blame at the Peruvian officials, his
preference for a system based on nebulous criteria as opposed to formal evidence was
a major factor why his compiled lists were not fulfilled by the Peruvian deportation task
forces. He bemoaned that when lists were presented to Peruvian officials they were
treated lightly because of the commitment of Peru to deport as many Japanese as
possible rather than ones who fit criteria. As discord continued and the State
Department began questioning the real accomplishment of Emmerson and Norweb
targeting Japanese leaders exclusively, Norweb relented to a new formation of
deportation planning. Writing to Secretary Hull, Norweb now asserted “The most
satisfactory solution would be the removal to the U.S of all persons in Peru of Japanese
race,” and that this action would greatly please the Peruvian government as well.249
Unsurprisingly, Norweb disclosed that President Prado from Peru was very much
interested in getting rid of the Japanese permanently, and would like to arrange the
program such that the Japanese would not be returned to Peru later on.”250 The State
Department, despite the unrealistic factors prohibiting the removal of nearly 30,000
Japanese from the country, offered no immediate objection.
The decision to now seek to incarcerate all Japanese stemmed in part from a trip
undertaken by Emerson with Chinese embassy officer George Woo. Emmerson,
distraught over the failure of his plan to incarcerate Japanese leaders, hoped to
investigate Japanese activities firsthand to see the effects of the anti-Japanese actions
levied. He chose the Chinese because of the perceived similarities between Chinese
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and Japanese, and felt they would be willing to help the investigation because of their
loyalty to the allied cause.251 He found that Japanese were active in negating their
blacklisting and detainment by using financial means to effectively buy and bribe their
status to immunity.252 This revelation escalated frustration in the program and likely
tipped Emmerson and Norweb to broaden the scope of the deportation program to
match what the Peruvian State admittedly desired: detaining any Japanese under with
any slight appearance of threat. Relying on Woo and the local Chinese likely yielded a
bias opinion of the Japanese due to the extreme and historic animosity between the
Chinese and Japanese in Peru. It is unlikely that Emmerson overlooked this by
accident, knowing the history of Asians in Peru as well as anyone, as he turned to the
Chinese to help facilitate further sanctions against the Japanese communities.

Concluding Chapter 3: Peru’s Racial Destiny against the America’s
Racial Nightmare
As evidenced, Peru was relentless in pursuit of eradicating the Japanese
presence from its boundaries entirely, something the State Department was initially
hesitant to engage in, before beginning to change direction during 1943. The evidence
of Peru ignoring blacklist criteria requirements designating Japanese leaders as primary
suspects for deportation substantiates their ideology toward the process. Similarly,
rhetoric from President Prado in his discussions with the United States affirmed the
desire to not only remove as many Japanese as possible, but also his consideration that
such action must be permanent if the U.S desired full Peruvian support. As the State
Department relented to Peru’s ideology, a third party entered the foray, as beginning in
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1943 the Department of Justice proceeded to investigate the Peruvian deportation
process with extreme skepticism over it’s legality. Although mentioned by Peru, the
State Department chose to ignore any discussions of post-war policy concerning the
Japanese removed from Peru to the United States. For the most part, this can be
attributed to the State Department’s unrealistic desire to both repatriate most of the
Peruvian Japanese to Japan, and also their aspiration to use the Japanese from Peru to
exchange for American prisoners in Japan. While this was a reasonable belief in the
early years of the war, by 1943 it became clear that very few Japanese in Peru were
going to be used for such processes.
When considering by 1943 that both countries had largely agreed that they
hoped to remove as many Japanese from Peru as possible, the two country’s antiJapanese racial ideology met at an impasse. In many ways, Peru’s path to place their
Japanese population in rightless spaces was enormously successful. Beginning with
their unsettling of their legal status throughout the 1920’s, and enforced and rationalized
under their influential eugenic ideology which portrayed the Japanese a supreme threat
to Peru’s national race, the deportation met two important goals for the country. It
severely dented Japanese influence in the country and removed a large proportion of
the population, and it also exiled them permanently, as after the war less than 5% of
those deported ever returned to Peru.
In contrast, the United States, the official instigators of Japanese American
incarceration and the model of Pan-American regime of rightlessness against the
Japanese, found themselves in an ironic situation. The program they also relentlessly
engendered materialized into an imminent post-war disaster, where not only were
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thousands of Japanese from Peru displaced within U.S boundary, but the Japanese as
a whole were now even a greater threat to America’s racial destiny. Operating under
wartime paranoia, the United States failed to address the issue of Japanese Peruvian
legal status within their country during incarceration until it was much too late to
overturn thousands of completed deportations. After proliferating a Pan American
model of rightlessness, also rationalized by eugenic ideology which labeled the
Japanese a menace to the model American nation with a dominant white race, the
United States paradoxically post-war now confronted an even greater Japanese
presence. The majority of the Japanese from Peru deported and incarcerated during
the war remained in the United States after it’s conclusion, enduring a difficult process
to attain status as U.S citizens.
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Conclusion
Approximately 2,264 Latin Japanese were deported from the various American
Republics to the United States between 1941-1945. Peru produced approximately
1,771 of these Latin Japanese, incarcerated in INS camp across the United States.
When the global war receded, despite countless U.S political and legal machinations,
Peru refused to allow the return of the Japanese to Peru.253 Although the majority
remained in the United States, America was still relentless in its attempts to deport or
repatriate the Peruvian Japanese to Japan, despite the fact that many of them had
never previously residing in the country. The immeasurable devastation of millions of
ethnic minorities across the globe during the World War unfortunately relegates the
injustices of the Japanese from Peru to the peripheral of World War II human histories.
This thesis offers a historical analysis of their situation in hopes of greater recognition of
this transnational human history.
Furthermore, this thesis establishes how subjects become rightless even
transnationally, but more importantly, how a path to rightlessness requires a designation
of undesirable prior to the rightless period. In the few histories on the subject of the
Japanese from Peru and their incarceration, few scholars demonstrate how the
foundation of Japanese rightlessness was formed and gradually progressed throughout
their entire settlement process. Their life as stateless humans with restricted mobility
and status began even in their home country of Japan, as departing Japan meant
abandoning any rights as Japanese citizens once they crossed the ocean to Latin
America. Peru and the United States, through a combined Pan American ideology of
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anti-Japanese discourse and policy, marginalized the Japanese in Peru to the bottom of
the country’s racial and social hierarchy, economically depriving them of stability, and
hindering any effort to ascend the social scale. Constantly attributed as a transnational
history because of the migration across borders and their deportation, this story is
fundamentally transnational because of how the terminus of anti-Japanese sentiment
was threaded between the two countries. The transnational nature of this history
insulated their undesirable and rightless path, making it impenetrable to break from until
the cessation of world conflict forced a reevaluation of their status.
Throughout the entire history, the plight of the Japanese in Peru was underlined
by the discourse of racial destiny extremely pertinent to a Peruvian society rampant with
nationalism and nativism. Coinciding with a period of greater eugenic ideology
consciousness, which relegated the Japanese biologically, morally, and culturally
undesirable, paranoia of militarism and Japanese reproduction on Peruvian soil
fomented endless hatred toward the Japanese subjects. This discourse not only
possessed a integral role in their path to undesirable, but also the facilitation of their
rightlessness, as ridding Peru of the Japanese menace became a crucial component of
Peru’s ideal racial destiny.
Although not discussed in this thesis, the trauma caused by Peru and U.S for the
Japanese subjects lasted generationally into the latter 20th century. Attempts to
reconstruct the social bonds of their communities, specifically in Peru, were hindered by
the continuation of a flawed legal process which prevented the Japanese from Peru to
decide their own mobility post-1945. Demonized by a hemispheric agenda of antiJapanese rightlessness, the Japanese from Peru epitomize how ethnic Japanese
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across the world continued to confront racism after the war, as their struggle for stable
status became a generational story, still not adequately redressed to the present day.
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